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  i 
ABSTRACT  
   
In the past 100 years pet, zoo/aquarium, and research animals 
have gained unprecedented legal protection from unnecessary human 
harm via the creation of strict animal cruelty laws. Due to the work of 
moral philosophers and compassionate lawyers/judges animal cruelty 
laws have been improved to provide harsher punishments for 
violations, had their scopes widened to include more animals and had 
their language changed to better match our evolving conception of 
animals as independent living entities rather than as merely things for 
human use. However, while the group of pet, zoo/aquarium, and 
research animals has enjoyed more consideration by the US legal 
system, another group of animals has inexplicably been ignored. The 
farm animals that humans raise for use as food are exempted from 
nearly every state and federal animal cruelty law for no justifiable 
reason. In this paper I will argue that our best moral and legal theories 
concede that we should take animal suffering seriously, and that no 
relevant difference exists between the group of animals protected by 
animal cruelty laws and farm animals. Given the lack of a relevant 
distinction between these two groups I will conclude that current 
animal cruelty laws should be amended to include farm animals. 
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 1 
Introduction 
Humans and non-human animals have had a long history of 
interaction that has ranged from antagonistic to symbiotic in nature. 
During the infancy of our species, humans and non-human animals1 
began their relationship as competitors or enemies. But as humans 
matured and began to form societies the relationship between humans 
and some non-human animals became one of mutual dependence, in 
the case of non-human animals used for food, or even friendship, in the 
case of non-human animals treated as pets. The recognition of the 
value of non-human animals to humans facilitated the creation of legal 
protection for these animals and that legal protection has continued to 
expand, albeit slowly, to the point that ethical and legal arguments are 
now being made in favor of granting many non-human animals a 
variety of the rights that historically have been the exclusive rights of 
people. However, while a select group of non-human animals, namely 
pet, zoo/aquarium, and research animals, has gained an increasing 
amount of legal protection, another group of non-human animals, those 
people use for food, has inexplicably been left in the dark-ages in terms 
of legal protection.  
                                            
1I will use non-human animals and animals interchangeably 
throughout the paper. My reason for using non-human animals at all is 
to draw attention to the fact that humans are also animals.  
 2 
My goal in this paper will be to attempt to shed some needed 
light on the unjustifiable discrepancy between legal protection for the 
privileged group of non-human animals and non-human animals used 
for food (which will henceforth often be referred to as farm animals). I 
will outline five of the best2 ethical theories (virtue ethics, Kantianism, 
contractarianism, utilitarianism and rights based), that deal with 
human obligations to animals. I will follow by sketching a brief history 
of animal law beginning in the 17th century and continuing to the 
present. In my examination of the various ethical theories I will show 
that while the ethical theories are not in complete agreement on what 
the relationship between humans and animals ought to look like, all of 
the theories highlight some intuitively appealing characteristic of the 
relationship between humans and animals. All, these theories at least 
agree that humans should not be cruel3 to animals. Having shown that 
                                            
2 I count these theories as the best because they are the most 
consistent and the most plausible with respect to our intuitions about 
morality.  
 
3 What I mean by cruel here and everywhere else in this paper is 
something that is unnecessarily harmful. To better illustrate what I 
mean consider the following examples of necessary and unnecessary 
pain. Getting vaccinations for various diseases is painful, but the pain 
of vaccination is a necessary result of being stuck with a needle and 
therefore the practice or act of vaccination is not cruel.  Contrast the 
vaccination case with a case of performing invasive surgery without 
the use of readily available anesthetic. The surgery will be 
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the major ethical theories all agree on some form of protection from 
cruelty for animals, I will then examine current laws pertaining to the 
protection of pet, zoo/aquarium, and research animals, and I will 
conclude the paper by arguing that current laws that protect only pet, 
zoo/aquarium, and research animals ought to extend the same 
protection to farm animals.  
Morality and the Law 
 Before delving into the history of animal law or 
examining arguments about the moral and legal worth of animals I 
would like to give an explanation of the relationship between morality 
and the law. What is morally required and what is legally required do 
not always mean the same thing, for instance a law that commanded 
white-skinned people to kill black-skinned people, in order to keep the 
gene line pure, would not be moral but might be the law in certain 
states. Nevertheless, what is legally required is often influenced by 
what is morally required. Laws against incest, stealing, murder, 
assault, and so on all seem to be influenced by the moral views of the 
society that creates the laws. For instance, murder is illegal, but it is 
illegal because it is morally wrong to kill innocent people. Moreover 
                                                                                                                       
excruciatingly painful, but it needn’t thanks to availability of 
anesthetics and thus the pain is unnecessary and the act cruel.  
 4 
much of the debate about controversial laws such as gay marriage laws 
and abortion laws often hinges on differences in the moral convictions 
between the opposing sides. If one believes that there is a moral 
sanction against homosexuality, then one is probably going to endorse 
the creation of a law that prevents homosexual marriage and vice 
versa. It should be noted that there are also laws that do not 
necessarily line up with a moral requirement. Traffic laws requiring 
that one not turn left or right during specific times of the day are laws 
that do not seem to have a moral corollary. While the law and morality 
do not always go hand in hand, the laws that are believed to be the 
most important, laws against murder, cruelty, etc., always have an 
underlying moral parallel and given this relationship we may infer 
that a moral requirement may serve as a reason to create an identical, 
or nearly identical, legal requirement.  
Moral beliefs are, I claim, essential to the creation of the most 
important laws in a society and laws protecting people and animals 
from unnecessary harm, aka cruelty, and injustice are two such laws. 
The method of moving from a moral requirement to a legal 
requirement has heavily influenced the creation of the laws protecting 
animals from harmful human action and in my argument I assume 
that a moral sanction against being cruel to animals provides us with a 
 5 
reason that may justify the creation of a legal sanction against being 
cruel to animals. 
Descartes, Religion and Animal Consideration Prior to the 1800s 
For the longest time in human history animals were not treated 
with much, if any, moral consideration and very little theorizing about 
what humans ought to do, paid any attention to the possibility that 
humans had obligations to animals. Two of the main culprits behind 
the belief that animals were not worthy of moral consideration up until 
about the beginning of the 17th century, were probably Christianity 
and the philosopher Rene Descartes.  
The language in the Christian story of creation can easily be 
interpreted as giving humans dominion over animals and as 
presenting the view that animals exist to be used by humans.4 While 
this dominion and use interpretation of the Genesis story has been 
challenged in recent history,5 the following passage was undoubtedly 
used as justification for treating animals as mere objects for human 
use, “And God blessed them and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and 
                                            
4 The Holy Bible, King James Version, Genesis Ch. 1, (New York: 
American Bible Society: 1999); Bartleby.com, web accessed February 
18, 2012,  http://www.bartleby.com/108/01/1.html#S1. 
 
5 Roderick Nash, The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental 
Ethics (University of Wisconsin Press, 1989).  
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multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion 
over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every 
living thing that moveth upon the earth.”6 If human kind was 
commanded by their revered creator to take control over all other 
living creatures it, and no stipulations or advice was given on how that 
control ought to be exercised, it might follow that humans are allowed 
to do anything to animals, including killing, eating, trapping, beating, 
and depriving them of food, water, shelter without fear of violating a 
moral or legal obligation. Given how widespread the influence of 
Christianity was in the pre-modern western world it should not be 
surprising that no moral or legal laws specifically addressing human 
treatment of animals were adopted until the 17th century.  Christian 
doctrine dominated much of the moral landscape leading up to the 17th 
century, but it was not just religious teachings that called into 
question whether humans have any obligations to animals. Renes 
Descartes is hailed by many in field to be “the father of modern 
philosophy”, but the “father” had a very un-modern view of animals. 
According to Descartes animals were akin to fleshy machines, because 
while animals have the ability to move and interact with the world 
                                            
6 “Genesis” Ch.1 Verse 28, Accessed February 18, 2012. 
http://www.bartleby.com/108/01/1.html#S1 
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they lack the capacities to speak, believe, think, consciously7 feel pain, 
and reason. 8 He further claimed that God created the human soul to 
have the aforementioned capacities and that these special capacities 
create an inseparable divide between humans and animal machines. 
Descartes did note that animals are similar to humans in many 
respects; he admitted that animals eat, sleep, reproduce, and make 
their passions known to one another, and that animals are better at 
humans with respect to some physical tasks, but he staunchly denied 
that animals share the ability to think, speak, believe, consciously feel 
pain, or reason with humans. He concluded that since animals lack the 
special human capacities, that humans commit no crime when they 
eat, kill, or use animals; just as a human does not commit a crime 
when they take apart or destroy a piece of machinery they own.9 
                                            
7 Descartes claimed that animals had the proper equipment to produce 
the reaction that humans associate with pain, but since they lacked 
minds animals were unable to consciously experience pain in the way 
that humans do. 
 
8Rene Descartes, “Animals are Machines,” in Environmental Ethics: 
Divergence and Convergence, eds. S. J. Armstrong and R. G. Botzler 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 281-283. 
 
9 “Thus my opinion is not so much cruel to animals as indulgent to 
men—at least to those who are not given to the superstitions of 
Pythagoras—since it absolves them from the suspicion of crime when 
they eat or kill animals.” -Rene Descartes, “Animals are Machines,” 
285. 
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Descartes had an incredible mind and he made tremendous 
contributions to the growth of philosophy, but there are two striking 
problems with his argument that animals are no different than 
machines. 
The first objection to Descartes’s argument is an empirical one. 
He claimed that animals lack certain capacities that humans have. 
Today most educated people would not disagree with the claim that 
animals do not have the capacity to reason or that animals cannot 
speak in the way that humans do, but the claim that animals cannot 
consciously feel pain, think, or form beliefs should be readily denied, 
given the discoveries of modern animal biology and psychology. 
Animals are certainly capable of perceiving the world around them and 
coming to form beliefs based on those perceptions. For example, a cat 
or dog may come to form the belief that the sound of an electric can 
opener will lead to appearance of food in her food bowl and as a result 
of this belief quickly appears next to her food bowl. Descartes may 
have objected to such an example by claiming that in such instances 
what is really going on is not belief formation, but some form of 
 9 
conditioning to a stimulus that is a mere biological reflex.10 Such an 
objection, however, seems mistaken. A reflex action entails that the 
animal will automatically respond to the stimulus regardless of other 
circumstances, but a dog or cat who hears the can opener may not 
always quickly appear next to the food bowl. I have observed on 
numerous occasions that a cat, who normally rushes to the food bowl 
when the can opener is used, will not respond to the can opener sound 
if otherwise occupied in a game of catch-the-yarn-ball or when she has 
just eaten. That the animal does not always respond to the can opener 
in the same fashion seems like a good reason to think that the animal’s 
behavior is not a mere reflex and that something more sophisticated, 
like belief formatting that the can opener sound will result in food in 
the food bowl, is going on in the animal’s brain.  
The second objection to Descartes’s claim that animals are mere 
machines is that some of his reasons for thinking that animals are 
machines just are not relevant. Descartes claimed that animals lack a 
rational soul (or the capacity to reason) and the capacity for human-
like speech and are therefore more similar to machines than humans. 
But one might object that being able to reason or speak as humans do 
                                            
10 Reflex in the sort of knee-jerk reaction sense. These sorts of action 
are mere responses to a stimulus that bypass any higher cognitive 
functioning, such as belief formation or assessment.  
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is not a good reason for differentiating a living human from a machine.  
Young children, the comatose and people with serious cases of 
alzheimers may not have the capacity to reason or speak, but most 
people agree that despite this lack of capacities these individuals are 
still people and not mere machines. Similarly it is easy to imagine a 
case of some non-human rational agent11 that does not communicate in 
the way that humans do, via speech, writing, or sign-language, and yet 
still believe that this agent is a living biological entity more similar to 
a human than a machine.  
Descartes did not explicitly say anything about the moral worth 
of animals, but given his description of animals as mere machines and 
his claim that a person is above suspicion of criminal activity when 
they eat or kill animals12 it is probably safe to assume that Descartes’s 
view on what humans owed to animals was very minimal. It also does 
not seem unreasonable to assume that if one thought of animals as 
machines, then it would be morally unproblematic to use and treat 
animals like machines. But regardless of what Descartes thought 
about the moral status of animals, his argument that animals are no 
                                            
11 An extraterrestrial that has some extra sense perception enabling 
the species to communicate via thought for example.   
 
12 See footnote 9. 
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different than fleshy machines has been empirically disproven and 
should be dispensed with.  
Virtue Ethics: Aristotle and Nussbaum 
Another way to think about human moral obligations to animals 
was created ~2,500 years ago by philosophy’s founding fathers. Plato 
and Aristotle are credited with creating an ethical theory based on 
promoting and attaining human virtues like courage, temperance, 
benevolence and wisdom. Both writers were focused on providing 
guidance for human moral action, but the quest for virtue could 
certainly have implications about how a person ought to interact with 
animals. 
According to the virtue theory of ethics, what a person ought 
morally to do is what a virtuous person would do. This requires that a 
person act in ways that are not only virtuous, but also promote the 
growth of commonly accepted human virtues, such as loyalty, respect, 
courage, benevolence and so on. The intuitive support of this view is 
that some people really seem to be model moral agents who embody 
characteristics that obviously less moral people should have. Mother 
Teresa, for instance, had virtuous character traits that made her an 
ethical person and most of us would unhesitatingly admit that her 
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compassion should serve as a guide to how we all should act towards 
other people.  
 I listed a number of simple virtues, but according to virtue 
theory a real virtue cannot be described so simply. It is not enough 
that one simply have the virtues of compassion or generosity as 
particular traits, but one must also have the complex set of desires, 
emotions, and beliefs that we associate with the purest form of the 
trait. So if Mother Teresa had behaved with compassion, but lacked 
the desire to be compassionate or had the belief that being 
compassionate would allow her to get away with some other vice, then 
she would not have been compassionately virtuous.  I have used 
Mother Teresa as an example of a moral saint who embodies the pure 
form of some virtues, but virtue theory also recognizes that less pure 
instantiations of a given virtue are still admirable. Not all of us can be 
Mother Teresas, but all of us can attempt to aim at the pure form of a 
virtue and through frequent iterations of behaving virtuously one may 
form their character to be the purely virtuous sort represented by 
moral saints.  
Virtue theory equates being moral with having a virtuous 
character that disposes one to behave in virtuous ways, but why should 
any of the virtues serve as a model for leading a moral life? According 
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to Aristotle the concept of a personal virtue is closely tied to the 
concept of a good life or natural flourishing for people. All people seem 
to grasp that there is a bad way for people to live and then there is a 
way for people to flourish or live well. The bad way for people to live is 
one in which their natural capabilities as a human are frustrated or 
not nourished to the extent that they should be. We can imagine such a 
bad life with respect to capability frustration by thinking about the life 
of a slave who is unable to exercise her autonomy, interact with the 
people she chooses, have the freedom to move and explore, and so on. 
Such a life is an undignified way for a person to live and no one would 
admit that such a life of enslavement is a good one. Similarly we can 
imagine the case of an incredibly lazy person who has no ambitions 
and spends the majority of their time sitting on a couch alone watching 
television and come to the undisputed judgment that a life so 
sedentary and devoid of social interaction is not the sort of life that a 
person should live.  The cases in which people lead bad or undignified 
lives make us realize that what we want, as Aristotle understood, is to 
live well.  The person who lives well seeks to better themselves and 
others by doing things like forming meaningful relationships, gaining 
knowledge, eating nutritious foods, exercising his or her body, 
promoting justice, and so on. The virtues are then ways in which a 
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person can achieve this kind of flourishing and it is the moral duty of 
individuals to promote that flourishing for themselves and it is the 
moral duty of a society, as required by the virtue of justice, to allow 
individuals to flourish by not impeding an individual’s ability to 
flourish and by teaching the members of the society what is and what 
is not virtuous.  
Aristotle and Plato were primarily concerned with the 
flourishing of human beings, but Aristotle recognized that flourishing 
was not a concept unique to humans. Animals too have natural ways in 
which they can live well or flourish. The cat who is able to hunt, 
procreate, play and socialize lives the life it was naturally made to live 
and lives that life well, while the cat who is kept in a cage all its life or 
dies young from disease fails to flourish.  
Since virtue theory requires the promotion of flourishing it 
might seem like virtue theory requires direct consideration of animal 
flourishing and the promotion of good lives for all animals. However, 
this is not the case, because virtue theory privileges human flourishing 
above all others, which is unsurprising since the theory was designed 
specifically to promote human flourishing through virtue. So while 
animals have ways of flourishing independent of humans, human 
 15 
flourishing entails using animals to further human ends.13 Human 
flourishing entails animal use, because it is claimed that humans live 
better lives by enjoying the pleasure and nutrition of eating animals, 
protection from the elements by using parts of animals to make 
clothing and so on. Basic virtue theory does afford, however, some 
consideration to the flourishing of animals. Virtue theory admits that 
it is moral to use animals to achieve the end of human flourishing, but 
it places moral sanctions on certain ways in which that use is carried 
out. For instance, a virtuous person may morally kill and eat animal to 
feed herself or others, but a person acts contrary to morality if she 
tortures an animal before killing it or kills an animal for mere 
enjoyment, because a virtuous person would not do such an inhuman 
act. A moral person then has certain duties to animals, but these 
duties are indirect, i.e. not to the animals themselves, but rather stem 
from the human requirement to act virtuously in order to nurture 
personal flourishing. Of course this seems like a plausible enough 
guide for how humans ought to behave towards animals, but it also 
seems that there is more wrong with torturing an animal than just the 
failure on the part of the human torturer to act virtuously.  
                                            
13 Tom Regan, Defending Animal Rights (University of Illinois Press, 
2006), 5-6. 
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Aritstotle’s virtue theory affords more consideration to animals 
than Descarte’s view or early theological views by requiring that 
humans not be cruel in their treatment of animals, but the original 
theory was not meant to give a robust account of how humans ought to 
behave towards animals and does not posit any direct duties to 
animals. The ancients created virtue theory with humans in mind and 
animals were likely considered only in cases in which they were useful 
to humans.  So, while ancient virtue theory lines up with many of our 
shared intuitions about how humans ought to act, I think it misses the 
mark with respect to our intuitions and beliefs about all the duties 
that humans have to animals. 
The virtue theory put forth by Aristotle does not, I claim, 
thoroughly account for all the direct duties that humans have to 
animals, but modern virtue theorists, like Martha Nussbaum, have 
tweaked and expanded Aristotle’s view to provide a richer explanation 
of what virtuous humans owe to animals. In “Beyond “Compassion and 
Humanity”: Justice for Nonhuman Animals Nussbaum argues for a  
capabilities based approach that would create direct duties to animals 
based on an animal’s capability to flourish.14  
                                            
14 Martha Nussbaum, “Beyond “Compassion and Humanity”: Justice 
for Nonhuman Animals,” in Animal Rights: Current Debates and New 
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Nussbaum mounts an argument for the promotion and 
protection of animal flourishing by moving from the intuitive judgment 
that humans have a moral obligation to promote all human flourishing 
to the judgment that human beings ought to promote the flourishing of 
any being that can flourish. Nussbaum claims that human beings and 
all living things have intuitively dignified ways of living in which the 
needs, desires, and capabilities of a living thing are fostered.  For 
humans a dignified life is one in which a human is able to: live a full 
life, be healthy, be protected from bodily harm, socialize with other 
people and other species, exercise all of the senses including 
imagination and though in a relatively unrestricted fashion, grow and 
develop emotionally, exercise the capacity for reason and plan one’s 
life, enjoy play and recreational activities, freely participate in politics, 
own property and have that property protected.15 The constituents of a 
dignified life are based on the basic capabilities that human beings 
need in order to flourish, but the list is not meant to cover every 
capability that contributes to human flourishing.  In keeping with a 
basic tenet of virtue theory Nussbaum asserts that individuals, 
                                                                                                                       
Directions, ed. Cass Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 304-305. 
 
15 Martha Nussbaum, “Beyond “Compassion and Humanity”: Justice 
for Nonhuman Animals,” 313-314. 
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societies, and governments have a moral obligation to promote the 
basic capabilities required for human flourishing and to remove 
impediments to flourishing.16 Nussbaum further asserts that it is also 
a requirement of justice to promote and protect human flourishing. 
Fostering and protecting the basic capabilities that lead to flourishing 
is what is owed to human beings, which in turn creates an entitlement 
for humans to have their flourishing promoted.  
Additionally Nussbaum is quick to point out that the 
capabilities approach focuses on the potential to have a capability 
rather than actual functioning. In the case of humans the basic 
capabilities are derived from thoughtful examination of functioning 
capacities that contribute to dignified life for most normally developed 
human beings, but functioning is not the determining factor for 
promoting individual flourishing.17 According to the capabilities 
approach even if a human does not have a functioning capacity, such 
as the capacity to reason, that human18 should not be excluded from 
                                            
16 Martha Nussbaum, “Beyond “Compassion and Humanity”: Justice 
for Nonhuman Animals,” 305. 
 
17 Martha Nussbaum, “Beyond “Compassion and Humanity”: Justice 
for Nonhuman Animals,” 312. 
 
18 Nussbaum applies the same approach to animals, but it should be 
noted that some animals lack even capability with respect to some 
 19 
having the opportunity to meet all of the basic requirements for 
flourishing. Nussbaum does admit that degrees of paternalism are 
warranted when an individual’s capacity for making autonomous 
choices is lacking or compromised, which seems to be the case for all 
animals, but even in these cases promotion of many of the basic 
capabilities is still possible and the obligation to promote those 
capabilities remains.  
Nussbaum appeals to the intuition that there is a dignified way 
for human beings to live based on the promotion of basic capabilities 
required for human flourishing, but she also recognizes the shared 
intuition that all living things are capable of living dignified lives in 
which their basic capabilities are allowed to flourish.19 The vast variety 
of animals that share the earth with humans each have unique ways of 
flourishing, the specific freedoms and opportunities required for the 
flourishing of a predator or undoubtedly different from that of a cow, 
but all animals also have basic capabilities that must be met in order 
                                                                                                                       
capacities that humans have and that one is not obligated to promote a 
capacity that a being is not even capable of having. This means that 
although we have an obligation to promote the capability for practical 
reasoning for children, even those with cognitive deficiencies, by 
creating the opportunity for children to go to school, we have no such 
obligation to create the opportunity for frogs to go to school.  
 
19 Martha Nussbaum, “Beyond “Compassion and Humanity”: Justice 
for Nonhuman Animals,” 306. 
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for that animal to live a dignified life. Nussbaum sees an analogy 
between some of the basic human capabilities required for a dignified 
life and the basic capabilities of animals. She claims that the basic 
capabilities required for animals flourishing are: life,20 bodily health, 
bodily integrity, sense/imagination/thought, emotions, practical reason 
(in some cases), affiliation, play, and control over one’s environment.21 
Animals share these capabilities with humans and are entitled to 
similar promotion and protection of these capabilities, but there are 
some noticeable differences based on the difference in quality between 
human capabilities and animal capabilities. Not all animals are 
capable of exercising practical reasoning to the extent that humans can 
and are thus not entitled to the promotion of practical reasoning. 
Animals also cannot take part in the political environment, so their 
ability to actively participate need not be promoted, but their 
                                            
20 Nussbaum draws a significant distinction between the human 
entitlement to life and the animal entitlement for life, even though the 
entitlements are based on the same capability. For humans the 
capability for life entitles one to be free to live a full life, but for 
animals Nussbaum is unwilling to extend the same entitlement. 
Nussbaum claims that animals are entitled to continue to live, even if 
they have no interest in continued life, but that life may be cut short in 
order to serve some necessary end such as feeding people or further 
medical knowledge through research.  
 
21 Martha Nussbaum, “Beyond “Compassion and Humanity”: Justice 
for Nonhuman Animals,” 317. 
 21 
flourishing requires that they be included in the conceptual framing of 
political policies. The key point is that although animals have 
qualitatively different capabilities and thus flourish in different ways, 
many of the basic capabilities we have a direct duty to promote for 
humans are shared by animals. So we should recognize that animal 
flourishing is different than human flourishing in many ways, which 
will influence judgments about what entitlements individual animals 
ought to have, but also acknowledge the similarities between human 
and animal capabilities. We can acknowledge the similarities by 
claiming direct duties to animals to promote the flourishing of the 
animals that humans have a responsibility for and by refraining from 
hindering the flourishing of those wild animals that humans are not 
directly responsible for.22  
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach gives a far more robust 
account of what humans owe to animals than Aristotle’s virtue theory 
by positing direct entitlements for animals. She, however, does not 
claim that humans and animals have the same entitlements. She 
admits that animals may ethically be used in ways that humans may 
                                            
22Martha Nussbaum, “Beyond “Compassion and Humanity”: Justice for 
Nonhuman Animals,” 311-312. 
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not,23 but she is adamant that humans have a direct obligation to 
promote animal flourishing. At the least promotion of animal 
flourishing requires that we not treat them as mere means by using 
them in unnecessary experimentation, by treating them in ways that 
are unnecessarily harmful, by providing basic veterinary care for 
animals under human care, by allowing them to socialize with other 
animals and move about in an open environment, providing animals 
with the opportunity for play and expression of natural behaviors, and 
to include them in the framing of political policies.24  
The Classic Kantian Approach and a Modern Interpretation 
 Aristotle’s virtue theory does not afford direct duties to animals 
and permits the virtuous person to use animals for his or her ends. A 
basic reading of the moral theory of Immanuel Kant offers a slightly 
different alternative that, like ancient virtue theory, denies that 
humans have duties to animals themselves. It does, however, affirm 
that humans have duties to one another not to harm animals. 
Additionally, a more nuanced and modern reading of Kant by 
                                            
23 Martha Nussbaum, “Beyond “Compassion and Humanity”: Justice 
for Nonhuman Animals,” 318-319. 
 
24 Martha Nussbaum, “Beyond “Compassion and Humanity”: Justice 
for Nonhuman Animals,” 314-318. 
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Christine Korsgaard provides reasons to believe that humans have 
duties to animals that are more than just duties to other humans.  
 An interesting feature of Kant’s moral theory, aka Kantianism, 
is that it offers a variety of different insights about what is morally 
required of people and how people ought to go about choosing a moral 
course of action. Kant was in tune with a variety of insights about 
moral action and was not uncomfortable in giving what appeared to be 
multiple methods for assessing how one ought to act. For instance, 
Kant gave three versions of what he called the categorical imperative 
(a command without exception used to guide human action). Version 1 
reads as follows, “Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the 
same time will that it should become a universal law.”25 This version 
equates the moral with what is rationally acceptable to all rational 
beings across all time. The second version of the imperative seems to 
focus less on rationality and more on the common belief and intuition 
that autonomous human beings are worthy of respect. Version 2 reads 
as follows, “So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person 
or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a 
                                            
25 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Basic 
Writings of Kant, translated by F. Max Mueller and Thomas K Abbot, 
edited by Allen Wood (New York: Modern Library, 2001),  178. 
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means only.”26 The third version of the imperative is “[to treat] the will 
of every rational being as a universally legislative will.”27 With each 
version Kant illustrated a different insight, that moral laws should be 
universal and rational, that morality should require respect for all 
humans as ends and that the moral laws willed by one rational being 
should be applied to all rational beings. Kant’s willingness to embrace 
multiple insights not only affected his moral theory for humans, but 
also his view on how humans ought to treat animals.  
Kant divided the world of living things into two28 categories: 
ends-in-themselves and means.29  Rational beings, the category which 
most adult humans fall into, are the only ends-in-themselves and 
everything else is a mere means. Kant argued that rational beings are 
ends in themselves, because by the power of each rational being’s 
                                            
26 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 186. 
 
27 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 188. 
 
28 It may be objected that in addition to ends-in-themselves and means 
that there are also ends, but ends, as it turns out, are just those means 
that an end-in-itself (otherwise known as a rational being) chooses to 
value as an end. For example, money, in its original state, exists as a 
means, but it may become an end if a rational being chooses to value it 
as such.  
 
29 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in 
Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, translated and edited 
by Mary Gregor (Cambridge University Press, 1997),  34-37. 
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legislative will he or she affirms that he or she matters as an end, and 
through rational reflection he or she comes to recognize that all other 
rational beings also count as ends worthy of his or her respect.30 For 
Kant nothing without such a legislative will could be an end-in-itself, 
because only rational beings can create value31 and nothing has the 
intrinsic value to make it an end-in-itself. 
 Kant also claimed that only an end-in-itself could create a duty 
for others to follow and therefore moral duty can only be owed to an 
end-in-itself. Given these beliefs one might have expected Kant to 
categorically deny that humans, as ends, have any duties to animals, 
as mere means,32 but Kant was surprisingly sympathetic to animals. 
In Metaphysics he claimed that a person should not be cruel or violent 
in their treatment of animals, because a person has a duty to herself 
and humanity in general to avoid cultivating such ghastly character 
                                            
30 Christine Korsgaard, “Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our 
Duties to Animals,” delivered at the Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values (University of Michigan, 2004), 3-4. 
 
31 Which includes the creation of the value of oneself and one’s ends.  
 
32 Kant even seems to suggest as much in “Conjectures on the 
Beginning of Human History,” in Kant: Political Writings, 2nd ed. 
trans. H.B. Nisbet, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge University Press, 1991),  
223-225. 
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traits.33 Kant’s theory, like virtue theory, affords indirect duties to 
animals. According to Kantianism humans have a duty not to treat 
animals with cruelty, not because doing so would be a violation of some 
duty to the animal itself (which would be a direct duty), but because 
individual humans have an obligation to his or herself and to each 
other not to cultivate inhuman traits that are inconsistent with or 
harmful to human rational nature.  
 The view that a person does harm to oneself and to others when 
he or she commits an act of cruelty against an animal has some 
intuitive appeal to it, but there is also something intuitively lacking 
about such a view. It seems clear that when one beats the pet cat or 
dog of another that he harms the person who cares for that pet and 
that harm should provide a reason not to beat the pet.34 It also seems 
plausible that fostering the character trait of cruelty would be bad for 
the individual who fostered such a bad trait.35  However, while 
                                            
33 Christine Korsgaard, “Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our 
Duties to Animals,” 15. 
 
34 Kant claims that each person has a duty to respect what other 
rational agents value and thus in disregarding another’s value(s) one 
acts immorally by failing to treat the other person as an end-in-itself. 
 
35 Such a trait would probably interfere with a person’s ability to 
peacefully interact with other people and peaceful interaction with 
others seems a necessity for any rational person’s existence.  
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harming oneself and other people seem to be reasons justifying the 
moral wrongness of unnecessarily beating an animal, the harm that 
the animal is subjected to seems equally, or even more strongly, 
justifying. What matters is not just that a human owner or the 
psychology of some individual person suffers, but also that an animal 
suffers. It would be immoral and disturbing to light my neighbor’s cat 
on fire and watch it burn to death, and my neighbor would no doubt be 
hurt by the loss of her cat, but to claim that the only thing that would 
be wrong about this act is the grief caused to my neighbor is to grossly 
ignore the fact that a living creature has suffered and died a terrible 
death.  Kant deserves some credit for defending animals against 
human cruelty, but his view still leaves something to be desired.  
 A classic reading of Kant does not fully encompass modern 
beliefs and intuitions about the duties humans have to animals, but 
Christine Korsgaard claims that Kantianism is equipped to grant 
greater respect to animals themselves than the classic reading would 
lead one to believe.36 Korsgaard posits that Kant’s theory would allow 
not only the valuing of the autonomous, rational nature of a being as 
                                            
36 Christine Korsgaard, “Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our 
Duties to Animal,” 2-4. 
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an end-in-itself, but also the animal nature of any being that has an 
animal nature.37    
 Korsgaard accepts Kant’s view that rational humans are the 
only conveyors of value, normative and otherwise, in this world, but 
also believes that in order for the project of morality to get off the 
ground rational humans must accept that the nature of any living 
being is good for that living being from that being’s point of view. This 
means that for a human, being rational is part of one’s natural good, 
but so is eating, drinking and socializing and these other natural goods 
are just like the natural goods of any living being (in this respect, 
unlike rationality, humans are not special). Korsgaard agrees with 
Kant that a duty can only be created by the legislative will of a 
rational being,38 but she also claims that if rational beings could not 
accept that their own natures were good, then it would seem to follow 
that the being could never have a reason to act or legislate with his or 
                                            
37 Christine Korsgaard, “Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our 
Duties to Animal,” 31. 
 
38 Important to note is that although a rational being is an end-in-itself 
that creates value for herself, the values the rational being creates are 
not valuable just because he or she creates them (in the hedonistic 
sense). The values are valuable, and worthy of respect by everyone, 
because a rational being created them. This recognition is what creates 
a duty for other rational beings to respect the values that any rational 
being creates.   
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her will, at least according to Kant’s view.39 Korsgaard emphasizes 
that she does not mean that people are just intrinsically valuable,40 but 
that every autonomous person must recognize, and legislate via his or 
her will, that she has value as an end-in-itself and consequently that 
all autonomous rational human beings have value, not just as an 
autonomous being, but also as an animal being with a natural good. 
Put another way, in recognizing that a person is an end-in-itself one 
wills that both the rational nature and the animal nature/natural good 
of a person are valuable independent of one another. When a person 
universalizes this idea, as Kant believed rational beings must, then it 
becomes clear that a person must will that the natural good of any 
living thing is a good end-in-itself. Korsgaard’s conclusion is that 
                                            
39 According to Kant humans create valuable ends by conferring value 
on them and this provides the incentive to pursue that end, but 
implicit in this process of value creation is the idea that each human is 
valuable as an end-in-itself and has a natural good that his or her 
rational nature helps him or her achieve. If one is unwilling to admit 
that he is valuable as an end-in-itself, then nothing he chooses to value 
as an end could have a reason to be thought of as good and therefore he 
would have no reason to pursue that end.  
 
40 Korsgaard, paralleling Kant, claims that value only comes from an 
act of legislation by the will of rational beings like human people and 
that positing that people simply have intrinsic value is a violation of 
this position. Korsgaard maintains that a person must choose that his 
or her own nature, both rational and animal, is good in order to make 
the judgment that he or she is a valuable end-in-itself, and that this 
gives a reason to pursue anything else that he or she values.  
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human animal natures, and the animal nature of any living being, 
must be valued as a good that is an end-in-itself and that is why people 
have moral duties to animals.41  
 There is something much more appealing about the view that 
human beings ought to respect the natural good of living things and 
therefore treat animals with moral respect, than the view that humans 
ought to treat animals with respect only because it would be harmful 
to humans not to. That a cow has a natural good to eat grass, raise 
offspring, and interact with other cows seems sufficient to create a 
duty to respect the natural good of the cow as an end-in-itself and not 
just as a mere means. However, Korsgaard notes that this view, when 
embraced to the fullest, has some problematic implications.  
 If all living things have a natural good that is a valuable end-in-
itself, then it seems to follow that plants have such a natural good and 
so do cockroaches, mosquitos, rats, etc. That these organisms have 
such natural goods then creates a duty for people to treat them as ends 
and it would seem that discharging all these duties would be 
impossible or intuitively implausible. Korsgaard does not want to claim 
                                            
41“In taking ourselves to be ends-in-ourselves we legislate that the 
natural good of a creature who matters to itself is the source of 
normative claims. Animal nature is an end-in-itself, because our own 
legislation makes it so.” Christine Korsgaard, “Fellow Creatures: 
Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animal,” 33. 
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that people have a duty to not eat plants or to refrain from killing 
pests like cockroaches, but her proposed theory of animal nature’s 
being ends-in-themselves, taken to its logical extreme, does seem to 
commit one to such unrealistic duties. Her response is that while it 
seems impossible or implausible to accept the extremes of her view, 
this should not deter anyone from trying their best to respect plants 
and animals and to readily accept the duties that one can act on. She 
claims this includes, in addition to the general Kantian prohibition 
against animal cruelty, refraining from hunting and killing animals 
and also stopping painful experimentation on animals, because 
animals matter. Animals, like people, are beings with their own 
natural goods and just as people respect the natural goods of other 
people, so too must they respect the natural good of animals.  
Contractarianism 
 In thinking about human obligations to animals one might 
wonder why people have moral duties to anything and what reason one 
has to be moral. Contractarianism is a moral theory, originally put 
forth by Thomas Hobbes around the middle of the 17th century, which 
attempts to provide an explicit answer to both of these important 
questions. Although the theory can readily explain the grounds for 
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duties between humans it has a much more difficult time explaining 
why people have any duties to animals.  
 There are several versions of contractarianism, but most 
versions can be safely assigned to one of camps, Hobbesian or 
Rawlsian, and for simplicity’s sake I am going to limit my discussion to 
these two forms of contractianism. On the Hobbesian account pre-
social humans became moral and recognized duties to others purely as 
a result of rational self-interest. Hobbes imagined that humans living 
in a bleak and dangerous state of nature would recognize the 
bleakness and the danger of living in a state where each individual 
person was left vulnerable to being preyed upon by some stronger 
person, and decide to form imagined social contracts42 that would 
protect their interests, like owning property and being free from 
unnecessary harm. This social contract is what grounds the moral 
duties that people to have one another and coupled with an executor of 
the terms of the contract insures that people discharge their duties. 
According to Hobbes when humans create this contract they are fully 
aware of their present status and capabilities. This way of creating the 
contract, in which the creators are “fully aware”, seems most like the 
                                            
42 Imagined in the sense that there is not a physical contract that 
people actually sign when entering into a moral society.  
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way in which actual contracts are made, but it can lead to problems of 
inequality and injustice if a particularly strong or large group wants to 
look out for its own best interest. So one can imagine that a large 
group of men living in a state of nature rationally want to create a 
social contract and that this group of men also lives with a much 
smaller group of women. It would be fair and just if the men also 
included the interests of the women in the contract, but there would be 
nothing irrational about the men opting to not only exclude the 
interests of the women from the social contract, but stipulate terms in 
the contract that would be in direct opposition with some or all of the 
women’s interests, since the men are likely physically stronger and far 
more numerous than the women. Likewise, in the case of animals, 
human beings would not act irrationally by completely excluding the 
interests of animals from the social contract. On Hobbes’s account 
animals can create no duties for people, since animals could not 
rationally enter into the contract or contribute to its creation, and 
people should treat animals only as their human interests dictate, 
which might include torturing or killing animals just for sport. That 
these sorts of injustices could result from the Hobbesian version of 
contractarianism might give one reason to reject the theory outright, 
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but one could also revise the theory in an attempt to avoid the problem 
of injustice. 
 John Rawls attempted just such a revision in the 1970s. Like 
Hobbes, Rawls imagined that the rational creators of a social contract, 
contractors in what Rawls called the “original position”,43 have certain 
motives in mind for creating the contract. These motives include the 
desire to procure the greatest amount of goods for oneself and the 
disinterest in the amount of goods procured by anyone besides oneself, 
or the difference between the goods procured by oneself and the goods 
procured by another.  Unlike Hobbes, Rawls further imagined that the 
original contractors should choose, 44 for reasons of justice and 
equality, to operate from behind a “veil of ignorance”. This hypothetical 
veil would restrict the original contractors from knowing their race, 
social status, capabilities (aside from the capability for reason or 
                                            
43 “Original Position,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2008, Web 
accessed 2/20/2012,  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/ 
 
44 Rawls’s theory has a more classically normative element than 
Hobbes in that Rawls asserted that justice and fairness should be 
emphasized in the creation of the social contract, while Hobbes made 
claims about what, empirically, the original contractors would 
rationally do. Rawls further claimed that the reason justice and 
fairness should be emphasized is because people have a shared 
intuition that justice and fairness are concepts that ought to be 
emphasized.  
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rationality),45 sex, life goals and so on. If the original contractors 
operated with the sort of ignorance that Rawls imagined, then the 
contractors would rationally accept two basic principles of justice: the 
liberty principle and the difference principle.   
The liberty principle states that all individual members of a 
society should be able to pursue their goals to the greatest extent 
possible without impeding the goals of other members. The original 
contractors would assent to this principle, because every rational 
person would assent to having the right to pursue their own goods, and 
since the rational contractors do not know what their individual goods 
will be they would also assent to giving everyone this right. The 
difference principle posits that social and economic inequalities should 
be arranged so that they always benefit the least well off.  This 
principle would be accepted, because the original contractors do not 
know what their position in society will be, which could very well be 
the worst position, and as a result it would be in each individual 
contractor’s best interest to insure that the interests of the worst off 
are always considered. The payoff of coupling the “veil of ignorance” 
                                            
45 Rawls believed that knowing one is rational is a requirement for 
creating a social contract, because without rational thought one would 
not be able to get a grip on the self-interested reasons that one has for 
entering into the contract.  
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with these two principles is that every member of society should be 
able to live an enjoyable life in which they pursue their own goods and 
this coupling should almost guarantee that minorities and the weak 
are not victimized by the majority or the powerful. 
Rawls’s theory posits a concept of justice as fairness with respect 
to individuals in a society being able to pursue their own goods and 
this conception of justice alleviates much of the worry about possible 
injustices associated with Hobbesian contractarianism. However, with 
respect to animals both forms of contractarianism seem to provide no 
satisfactory explanation of why humans have duties to animals. In A 
Theory of Justice Rawls expressly said, “Certainly it is wrong to be 
cruel to animals....The capacity for feelings of pleasure and pain and 
for the forms of life of which animals are capable clearly impose duties 
of compassion and humanity in their case. I shall not attempt to 
explain these considered beliefs. They are outside the scope of the 
theory of justice, and it does not seem possible to extend the contract 
doctrine so as to include them in a natural way.”46 It seems rather cold 
of Rawls to assert that animals lie outside the scope justice, but he saw 
no natural way to extend the hypothetical contract to include animals. 
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for Nonhuman Animals,”  299. 
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The “veil of ignorance” prevents a contractor from knowing all kinds of 
information about themselves, but one is allowed to know whether or 
not they are a rational human. With this knowledge one would have no 
rational problem with ignoring the interests of non-rational animals, 
and since animals cannot participate in the creation of the contract or 
abide by its mandates any duties that people have to animals would at 
best be indirect and would amount to something like “duties of 
compassion and humanity” which dictate that humans not treat 
animals with cruelty. 
 Despite what is explicitly stated by Rawls about animals being 
outside the scope of justice and the potential for Hobbesian 
contractarianism to deny human obligations to animals, both forms of 
contractarianism can admit that humans at least have an obligation to 
not be cruel to animals, because it is a wide spread interest of humans 
not to be cruel to animals.  
Utilitarianism, Singer and Objections 
 The ethical theories I have examined up to this point, 
discounting the modern interpretations, have not seemed to be able to 
account for the present commonly held intuition that humans have at 
least some direct duties to animals, such as the duty not to torture 
them. That most historic moral theories did not attribute direct human 
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duties to animals was likely due to the conception of animals as being 
insignificant when compared to humans, but that historic conception 
was eventually challenged by a new moral theory that would prove to 
be highly influential in the shaping of the modern animal ethics and 
animal law.   
 In 1780 Jeremy Bentham made one of the earliest attempts to 
shift the focus of human duty to animals from being duties to other 
humans to being duties owed directly to animals by controversially 
claiming that, “The question is not, Can they [animals] reason? nor 
Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”47 Bentham, unlike Aristotle, 
Hobbes, or Kant, did not ground moral worth in having some advanced 
cognitive capacity like reason or autonomy, nor did he require that 
moral worth be tied to human virtue or participating in the creation of 
a social contract. No for Bentham all that was needed to be included in 
the moral decision making process was the ability to feel pleasure or 
pain,48 and animals, it seemed to Bentham, could definitely feel pain.  
                                            
47 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (HarperCollins Publishers, 2002), 
203.  
 
48 It is important to note that while pleasure and pain might be 
described as mere physical sensations, they may also be described in 
terms of interest satisfaction for pleasure and interest frustration for 
pain.  
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But, then the obvious question is, “Why should suffering or feeling 
pleasure matter to morality?” 
 Bentham was dissatisfied with the ethical theories that came 
before him and sought to create an ethical theory that matched up 
moral obligation with the motivators of human action. Bentham 
believed that there were but two motivators of human action, pleasure 
and pain,49 and that pleasure was a good to be sought while pain was a 
bad to be avoided.50 Using these motivators as a guide Bentham 
created the ethical theory of utilitarianism, according to which an 
action is moral if it creates more pleasure than pain for the world and 
immoral if it creates more pain than pleasure for the world. However, 
while Bentham was looking for what motivated human beings, he did 
not restrict the focus of the utilitarian ethic to only human pleasure 
and pain. According to the theory, pleasure and pain are respectively 
morally good and morally bad, regardless of the race or species of the 
entity that experiences them, and therefore human beings, as moral 
agents, have a moral duty to consider the pain and pleasure of 
anything that can experience pleasure or pain. Animals can experience 
                                            
49 Pleasure and pain are also used synonymously with happiness and 
suffering.  
 
50 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), 1. 
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pleasure and pain, and thus when one is considering whether or not to 
kill and eat an animal, or to use an animal for entertainment or labor, 
one must weigh the pleasure that he will get from using the animal 
against not just the pain that some other human being who has an 
interest in the animal will feel, but also the pain that the animal will 
feel directly. If one is honest with the calculations, then it will often be 
the case that the animal pain is greater than the human pleasure for 
some act, and one therefore has a moral duty to refrain from the 
considered act.  
 Bentham advocated for the consideration of the pleasure and 
pain of all sentient beings, but many critics were quick to point out 
that pleasure and pain both come in degrees and differ in quality, and 
that perhaps the pleasure of people is of more moral significance than 
that of animals. Bentham’s student, John Stuart Mill, fleshed out 
Utilitarian theory to include both higher and lower pleasures as a way 
of distinguishing between a pleasurable action like reading a book and 
a pleasurable action like eating.51 Mill claimed that the higher 
pleasures should be preferred to the lower and although he does not 
come right out and say it, it seems implicit in his claims that only 
                                            
51 The higher pleasure of reading a book seems better in the sense of 
being richer and engaging the more sophisticated capacities of human 
beings.  
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humans are capable of experiencing the weightier higher pleasures.52  
While humans might be the only beings capable of experiencing the 
higher pleasures, being able to experience higher pleasures does not 
elevate all of one’s interests to a higher status than that of another 
sentient being. Due to greater complexity of the human nervous 
system it seems that the pleasure that a human gets from exercising 
all of his or her mental capacities is a better sort of pleasure than the 
pleasure that a cow gets from basking in the sun and likewise the 
pleasure that a human gets from eating an artfully prepared steak 
dinner is probably a richer sort of pleasure than the pleasure that a 
cow gets from eating grass,53 but just because the human can 
experience a richer sense of pleasure than the cow it does not follow 
that the human can discount the pleasure of the cow in his or her 
moral considerations. Both Bentham and Mill made a case for the 
consideration of animal pleasure and pain, but their pleas were not 
taken very seriously in their day and it was not until Peter Singer 
wrote Animal Liberation nearly 200 years after Bentham first made 
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53 For the reason that the human can appreciate the effort that went 
into cooking the steak and can enjoy the complexity of flavors present 
in steak due to her more sophisticated sense of taste.  
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his claim about the equal significance of suffering that animal pain 
was really considered by a significant number of people.   
 Utilitarianism became a dominant moral and political theory 
following its creation, and many animals benefitted from the theory’s 
rise to prominence. The first animal cruelty laws were ratified in the 
early 1800s,54 which resulted in a large reduction in the occurrence of 
intentional torture of animals for sport, such as in the case of dog and 
cock fighting, and an increase in the welfare of common livestock 
animals. While it was certainly a good thing that laws were created to 
deter people from fighting dogs and to penalize farmers who did not 
adequately feed or water their animals; the full implications of 
utilitarian theory were often left unrealized, probably due to the fact 
that many people still believed that human pleasure and pain counted 
for far more than animal pleasure and pain. This was especially true in 
the case of animals used for food and research and it was these groups 
of animals that Singer advocated for in 1975.  
 In Animal Liberation Singer argues that the happiness and 
suffering of animals counts just as much as the pleasure and suffering 
of humans, because there is no morally relevant difference between the 
interests of animals and the interests of humans. Singer makes an 
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analogy between the arbitrary and unfounded distinctions drawn by 
racists or sexists to distinguish one group of people from another, and 
the distinction that is drawn between humans and animals, which is 
now referred to by many philosophers as speciesism.55 The speciesist, 
Singer claims, attempts to draw a distinction between humans and 
animals by appealing to sentience, other mental capacities, souls, or 
some other criteria, but fails in this attempt, because each proposed 
distinction can be shown to be either unjustified or arbitrary. The 
Cartesian claim that animals cannot consciously feel pleasure or pain 
has been proven false by empirical science, the claim that humans 
have a special soul that animals do not have is empirically unverifiable 
and has been well argued against, the mental capacities of borderline56 
human cases (who are granted the same protection of interests as 
normal humans) are the same or less than that of most animals, and 
differences in genome, having fur or lacking a resemblance to human 
form are just arbitrary distinctions that should have no more bearing 
on moral relevance than skin color or gender.  Given the moral 
irrelevance of speciesism Singer concludes that the practices of using 
                                            
55 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 6-7. 
 
56 Borderline human cases include very young children, the senile, the 
severely mentally handicapped and the comatose.  
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animals for food and for research are immoral, because the pain caused 
to the animal is obviously greater than the benefit that humans derive 
from using the animal.  
 Singer’s argument is powerful and resonates with many of our 
shared intuitions about how people ought to treat animals, but the full 
extent of his view is also radical and as such his argument has 
garnered more than a few opponents. One of the more outspoken critics 
of Singer’s view is Judge Richard Posner and his argument contra 
Singer is, I think, fairly representative of the view of a majority of the 
human populace. 
 In Animal Rights: Legal, Philosophical, and Pragmatic 
Perspectives, Posner attacks both the plausibility of utilitarianism as a 
moral theory and Singer’s argument that animal pains and pleasures 
count just as much as similar human pains and pleasures. Posner first 
sets his sights on utilitarianism in general and asserts that, “By itself 
it has a certain appeal” but that when one takes the theory to its 
logical extreme “it becomes unpalatable and even bizarre”.57 He claims 
that utilitarianism entails a panspeciest ethic that could very well 
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obligate medical experimentation on humans in order to increase the 
pleasure of the far more numerous members of the non-human animal 
kingdom. He also makes an appeal to intuition in a hypothetical 
example in which a dog will bite the face of a child unless some 
incredible pain is administered to the dog, a pain so great that it is 
more than the pain that the child will experience from being bitten by 
the dog. In this example the utilitarian seems committed to letting the 
dog bite the face of the child and Posner wagers that no-one will agree 
to such a consequence of utilitarianism.58 These particular counter 
examples seem like strong reasons to question the credibility of 
utilitarian theory, but are Posner’s concerns valid?  
The imagined case of human experimentation for the sake of 
animals could be devastating to utilitarianism, if humans and animals 
experienced the same sorts of pleasures or pain and if there was no 
other way to increase animal pleasure than by testing on humans 
(which is obviously not the case). As Mill59 pointed out most humans60 
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59 Singer seems to disagree with Mill that some human pleasures (or 
preferences) are qualitatively better than animal pleasures, but Singer 
admits that most humans are capable of having more complex and 
varied pleasures than animals, which would prima facie give more 
weight to human lives when performing a utilitarian calculus.  
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are capable of experiencing many higher order pleasures that animals 
cannot experience and the extent to which a human can feel pain is 
typically greater than that of a non-human animal.61 Because humans 
can experience more varied and better quality pleasures their lives are 
worth more in the utilitarian calculus and human pain generally 
counts for more than animal pain,62 and therefore it is nearly always 
better to do testing, if such testing increases the amount of pleasure in 
the world, on non-humans, even if the goal of such testing is to discover 
some cure for animals. So in order for Posner’s example to have much 
bite he would need to imagine some ridiculous situation in which a 
handful of human utilitarians exist and billions of sick animals exist 
and that the humans are able to discover a cure for the sick animals by 
                                                                                                                       
60 The borderline human cases seem to be on a par with or worse off 
than most animals with respect to experiencing pleasure and pain and 
in such cases the utilitarian might be have to admit that she has no 
decisive reason to test on animals rather than borderline human cases.  
 
61 Humans are capable of experiencing anxiety and fear of death or 
pain in a way that most animals are not, because humans are able to 
see themselves as temporal beings with an extended future. Thus 
humans are not only harmed by the anticipation of pain, as well as the 
actual physical pain, but also by the loss of being able to complete 
future projects or fulfill future interests.   
 
62 This is not to say that human pain always counts more than animal 
pain, but that the pain that a human experiences is usually more 
significant and therefore it is granted more consideration. As a rule 
though, a human pain that is equally as intense and qualitatively the 
same as an animal’s pain counts the same as the animal pain.   
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performing some painful experimentation on one another. Given the 
ridiculousness of the scenario it is unclear how strong the example is in 
showing the absurdity of utilitarianism.  Likewise in the biting dog 
example, Posner asks us to assume that the only way to stop the dog is 
to deliver some great pain to him or her and that this pain will be 
greater than the pain of the child,63 but isn’t this assumption just silly? 
Are we really to assume that nothing but the infliction of some horrible 
pain is going to stop the dog from biting? Posner has a point that the 
possible extremes of utilitarianism seem, well, extreme, but his 
counter examples seem equally far-fetched and thus not very 
convincing. If Posner wanted to argue against utilitarianism I think he 
would have been better served by focusing on the classic human only 
counter examples in which one human being is sacrificed in order to 
provide happiness or pleasure to others.  
Having given what he considers a counter to utilitarianism, 
Posner then turns specifically to Singer’s argument for treating animal 
pain as being on an equal footing with human pain. He begins this new 
attack by claiming that Singer does not adequately take into account 
the pleasure that people get from eating meat and by attempting to 
                                            
63 The child is a better example to use, because the child’s ability to 
experience pain should be roughly equal with that of a dog due to the 
limited psychological and emotional capacities of the child.  
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show a correlation between equating human and animal pain with 
some of the horrendous acts perpetrated against humans by the Nazis 
in WWII.64  The Nazi correlation is not even worth examining, but the 
pleasure people gain from eating meat perhaps has some merit. It is 
true that many people gain much gustatory satisfaction by eating the 
flesh of animals and for the particularly glutinous eating animal flesh 
might result in lots of pleasure. However, it would be a mistake to 
think that the amount of pleasure that a human being gets from eating 
an animal is greater than, or perhaps even comparable to, the harm 
that an animal suffers when it is killed to feed a human. This is not to 
say that the pleasure that human beings get from eating tasty food 
does not count for anything, but rather to point out the arrogance in 
thinking that a preference for eating juicy steaks should receive more 
consideration than the life of an animal. One might argue that an 
animal need not suffer in order to feed a human, ie the animal is raised 
in a respectable way, allowed to live an acceptably lengthy life, and is 
killed in a painless fashion, and that minus any suffering humans 
commit no moral foul in using animals as a food source. From a 
utilitarian perspective this imagined case seems morally 
                                            
64 Richard A Posner, “Animal Rights: Legal, Philosophical, and 
Practical Perspectives,” 61-63. 
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unproblematic and even Singer would likely endorse such a practice of 
using animals for food.65 However, this imagined case is a far cry from 
the actual practices exercised in the use of animals for food. Posner’s 
objection is not that farm animals could be used in a harmless way, but 
that Singer does not take the human pleasure from eating meat into 
enough consideration given current (often very cruel) animal 
husbandry practices. I judge that Posner provides many poor reasons 
to reject utilitarianism and Singer’s animal consideration argument, 
but he does make a very strong criticism towards the end of his paper.   
Posner’s best counter to Singer is the denial of the view that 
speciesism is on the same level as racism or sexism and the appeal to 
the shared moral intuition that human lives, regardless of mental 
capacities, are inherently worth more than animal lives. Singer claims 
that speciesism is a bad thing and provides a valid argument for 
thinking that this is the case, but the fact of the matter is that most 
people just do not agree. The empathy that human beings share with 
one another is generally just greater than the empathy that humans 
                                            
65 In my opinion the imagined harmless use of animals for food is not 
as morally pristine as a utilitarian might think. The imagined practice 
is certainly better than the cruel ways in which we use farm animals 
now, but even if an animals is treated with the utmost respect and 
killed in a painless fashion after having lived for a few years, it still 
seems morally repugnant to take the life of living creature just to 
satisfy the human preference for eating animal flesh.  
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share with animals and when given the choice between saving a group 
of animals or a single human, most anyone, who isn’t a moral 
philosopher, is not going to think twice about sacrificing the animals to 
save the human. People are speciesist, they like being speciest and 
Posner knows this. Posner’s example of choosing between saving a 
single human and 101 chimpanzees, with 1% of the life value of a 
human,66 is as powerful a refutation of Singer’s argument as he likely 
needs for most people, because in the end Posner’s practical approach 
is likely to resonate more strongly with common shared intuitions than 
Singer’s precise and logical philosophical argument.  
Posner rejects the rational, and perhaps disconnected, 
philosophical view given by Singer and instead proposes a more 
commonsense or practical approach for interacting with animals. 
Posner wants to give human interests much greater value than any 
animal interest, but he is not unsympathetic to the suffering of 
animals, he claims that we ought to, “… learn to feel animals’ pains as 
our pains and to learn that… we can alleviate those pains without 
substantially reducing our standards of living and that of the rest of 
the world and without sacrificing medical and other scientific 
                                            
66 Richard A Posner, “Animal Rights: Legal, Philosophical, and 
Practical Perspectives,” 66. 
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progress.”67 He also accepts that laws punishing cruelty to animals are 
good laws to have.68 One gets the feeling that Posner is not anti-animal 
protection, but rather anti-philosophy about animal protection. He 
claims that philosophical argument is not convincing and that the best 
route to obtaining better treatment for animal is not through sound 
reasoning, but by appeal to human empathy. His point about what 
psychologically makes an argument convincing to most people is well 
taken, and even though he is unwilling to embrace the kind of 
liberation that Singer argues for, Posner is at least willing to accept 
that human beings should not be cruel to, or neglect, animals.  
Utilitarianism was the first major Western ethical theory to 
posit that humans have direct duties to animals and Peter Singer used 
the theory to argue for one of the most comprehensive views about 
human duties to animals that has ever been published, but as strict as 
utilitarianism is about human duties to animals it still leaves some 
room for animal exploitation, so long as a humans stand to gain a lot 
from causing animals pain. There is also an issue regarding how one is 
to go about actually using the theory as a guide for action.  
                                            
67 Richard A Posner, “Animal Rights: Legal, Philosophical, and 
Practical Perspectives,” 66. 
 
68
 Richard A Posner, “Animal Rights: Legal, Philosophical, and 
Practical Perspectives,” 66. 
 52 
Utilitarianism purports to provide a straightforward moral 
course of action by weighing the pleasure and pain for everyone 
involved not only at any particular moment, but also into the future. 
However, it has proven to be well-nigh impossible to do an actual 
empirical measurement of the pleasure and pain experienced by all the 
parties in any course of action and since there is not precise way of 
empirically measuring the consequent pleasure and pain of an action 
we are forced to rely on rough estimates based on intuition. Our 
intuitions favor human pleasure and absence of pain over animal 
pleasure and absence of pain and if the human pleasure gained from 
using an animal is great, such as in the case of using a few mice to test 
a cancer treatment that has the potential to save thousands of human 
lives, then utilitarianism provides no prohibition against sacrificing 
the animal. For many, this possibility of animal use is either an 
unproblematic aspect or a benefit of utilitarianism, but for the final 
group of ethical theories that I will examine, human duties are not tied 
to substantial or equal consideration of animal pleasure and pain, 
rather human duties to animals stem from rights that animals possess.  
Rights Based Theories 
 In the 20th century animals arguably received more 
philosophical attention than they did in every century prior. With all 
 53 
the new attention, novel theories about human obligations to animals 
were formed and arguments for the amount of consideration that 
animals should receive were taken to unprecedented levels. Towards 
the end of that century some philosophers began to see animals as 
deserving of more than just respect as useful tools for human beings, 
but as independent living entities entitled to the basic rights that all 
humans have.   
 Rights based views, like utilitarian views, posit direct human 
obligations to animals, but unlike utilitarian views, rights based views 
do not allow for any wiggle room with respect to use or sacrifice of 
animals to serve human interests. Take the case of a human right, 
such as the right to be free from unnecessary harm. If a human being 
has this right69 then the human cannot be unnecessarily harmed in 
order to serve another’s interest, even if some good is suspected to 
come from infringing upon the right, like in the case of torturing a 
                                            
69 I say “if a human being has this right”, because how any being has a 
right is not readily agreed upon. On one view rights are intrinsic and 
are granted just by being a certain sort of thing and on the opposing 
view rights are granted via a contract that is established by a society of 
rational beings. According to the intrinsic view humans have rights 
just because they are human, but on the contract view rights are 
human inventions that are granted by being agreed to in a social 
contract. The same opposing accounts could be applied to animal 
rights, but the animal rights theorists that I examine both appeal to 
the intrinsic rights view.  
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petty thief for information about a suspected theft. Animal rights 
theorists want to grant certain basic rights including the right to life, 
freedom from unnecessary harm, right to food, shelter, space, social 
outlets, etc. to non-human animals and they argue that animals 
deserve the same sort of uninfringeable protection for their rights that 
humans have. According to this sort of theory our duties to animals 
come directly from the rights that animals have and the strength of the 
duties to animals is just as strong as the strength of the analogous 
person-to-person duties. 
 All rights based theories of animal ethics appeal to rights as the 
source of duties, but each individual theory does not claim the same set 
of rights exist for animals in general or that all groups of animals have 
the same rights. One theory may claim that pet animals have the right 
to be free from unnecessary harm, but not wild animals, while another 
theory might extend the right to include wild animals. There are many 
theories about what rights animals have, but I will only be examining 
the work of two philosophers that I think present the best arguments 
for animal rights, Tom Regan and Gary L. Francione.  
According to Regan all animals have the basic moral right to 
respectful treatment and respectful treatment requires that animals 
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are never treated as mere means for use by humans.70 Regan’s basic 
moral respect is just like Kant’s second formulation of the categorical 
imperative, but Regan extends the imperative to cover animals, 
because he claims that animals have inherent value as experiencing 
subjects of a life. So while Kant claimed that humans have inherent 
value as rational agents, Regan posits that having a complex set of 
psychological and physical characteristics, that include but are not 
limited to being sentient, having desires, being able to plan and intend, 
having means of perception, and having emotions, is indicative of being 
an inherently valuable subject of a life.  
On Regan’s view inherently valuable subjects of a life, which all 
animals are, have the moral right never to be treated as a means. This 
entails that many of the ways in which humans interact with animals 
is morally wrong. Killing animals for food is wrong as is killing 
animals for their fur or skin. Additionally using animals as scientific, 
medical or cosmetic research subjects is wrong and any other way in 
which an animal’s basic right to respectful treatment is violated is also 
wrong. This view may seem rather extreme; using mice to test drugs to 
cure cancer does not really seem all that morally reprehensible to most 
                                            
70 Tom Regan, Defending Animal Rights (University of Illinois Press, 
2006), 43. 
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people,  but as Regan would probably be quick to point out the view 
that slaves had rights or that women had rights was viewed as 
extreme only a short while ago in human history.  
Still one might agree that treating people as slaves or restricting 
women’s’ rights on the basis of gender alone was and is wrong, but 
disagree that using animals as a means to human ends, whether 
significant or trivial, is similarly wrong. One could maintain that 
animals are somehow relevantly and significantly different than 
humans, but what would the relevant and significant difference be? 
Just as Singer asserted that the alleged differences between humans 
and animals was a result of mere speciesism, Regan claims that the 
differences proposed by critics of the rights view are irrelevant and 
that the only thing that matters for having rights is being the 
experiencing subject of a life. Some critics of the view propose that 
humans have rights and animals don’t, because humans are rational or 
because humans actually contribute to the society of the social 
contract, but Regan’s response is that very young children, the senile 
and mentally impaired human beings lack these capacities or abilities 
and yet are still viewed as having the basic moral right to respectful 
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treatment.  Other critics, such as R. G. Frey,71 claim that the idea of 
inherent rights is just non-sense and that neither humans nor animals 
have inherent rights. Frey gives the example of human being whose 
quality of life is so bad that it “…is a life I would not even wish upon 
my worst enemies,”72 and concludes that to call such a life inherently 
valuable makes no sense and that it would be  best to dispense with 
talk of inherent value all together.  Regan admits that Frey is correct 
in his assessment that the quality of life for both humans and animals 
can vary to the degree that one would not wish to live at certain levels 
of life quality, but as Regan rightly points out, inherent value is not 
the same as quality of life. Regan notes that inherent value is a 
difficult thing to verify empirically and that his ethical theory would be 
simpler if he did not appeal to inherent value, but nevertheless he 
asserts that the best ethical theory about human obligations must 
posit inherent value,73 and that being the experiencing subject of a life 
is sufficient for having inherent value. His response appears valid, 
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72 Tom Regan, Defending Animal Rights, 49. 
 
73 Regan does not say specifically why the best ethical theory, but 
presumably he has something like Kant’s view about the grounding of 
human created value necessarily stemming from the inherent value of 
people in mind.  
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because inherent value does seem to do the best job of explaining why 
humans have the shared belief that humans have obligations to 
animals and to borderline persons with incredibly low qualities of life. 
When we argue about whether a person in a comma ought to be kept 
alive or that a person with a severe mental impairment ought to be 
able to live a life, any judgment on the side of protecting the lives of 
these individuals must appeal to the idea of inherent value of being the 
subject of a life. Even if one does not posit the existence of inherent 
value, one could still claim that animals and humans, regardless of 
quality of life, should not have their qualities of life further degraded 
by cruel or unnecessarily harmful treatment. One could mount such an 
argument by deriving a right to be protected from cruelty via an appeal 
to some general moral law such as, “it is always wrong to 
unnecessarily harm sentient beings”. This is the approach that Gary L. 
Francione uses in Animals: Property or Persons? 
Francione claims that any action that results in unnecessary 
pain to a sentient being is wrong in itself, and that this gives everyone 
a moral duty, owed directly to the sentient being, to refrain from 
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performing such an action.74 Francione calls this the humane 
treatment principle and supports the claim that we ought to follow 
such a principle by both an appeal to the incredibly widespread 
acceptance of the principle and to the use of the principle by the legal 
system to justify all sorts of animal cruelty laws. The humane 
treatment principle is uncontroversial, but Francione makes the 
further claims that although people generally agree that animals 
should not be unnecessarily harmed, in practice all sorts of 
unnecessary harm is perpetrated against animals, that the reason for 
this disparity between people’s beliefs and their actions is due to the 
fact that animals are viewed as property and that in order to promote 
the following of the humane treatment principle the interest of 
animals in not being subjected to unnecessary harm by humans must 
be protected by a legal right.75  
As Francione points out, there are far too many cases in which 
the interest of animals in being free from unnecessary harm is 
blatantly ignored in favor of some less weighty human interest. In 
                                            
74  Gary L Francione, “Animals: Property or Persons?” in Animal 
Rights: Current Debates and New Directions, ed. Cass Sunstein and 
Martha Nussbaum (Oxford University Press, 2004), 113. 
 
75 Gary L Francione, “Animals: Property or Persons?” 113, 116 and 
124.  
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laboratory experimentation animals are subjected to all sorts of pains 
that may not be necessary to attain the information that the 
researchers are looking for, as in the case of a fairly recent obesity 
experiment on rhesus monkeys,76 and factory farms across the country 
are allowed to do any number of cruel acts to animals, like un-
anesthetized castration, “[w]henever the purpose for which the act is 
done is to make the animal more serviceable for the use of man.”77 So 
the law does not practice what it preaches and according to Francione 
the culprit responsible for the failure to act on the humane treatment 
principle is the property status of animals.  
The law and most people view animals as property of humans 
and Francione claims that it is ridiculous to think that the interests of 
property will ever really be considered when weighed against the 
interests of a property owner.78 If the owner of a car wants to change 
                                            
76 Andrew Pollack, “Today’s Lab Rats of Obesity: Furry Couch 
Potatoes,” New York Times, February 19, 2011, web accessed 3/1/2012, 
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77 Gary L Francione, “Animals: Property or Persons?” 118. 
 
78 Dr. Joan McGregor pointed out to me that there are some legal 
cases, wetlands for example, in which a property owner is significantly 
restricted in the use of their property. These cases, however, are few in 
number and the cases involving legal protection of a shared 
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the color of the car or put in a new engine, the owner never stops to 
consider if the car has an interest in not having the changes made, and 
even if the car had such an interest the owner’s interests would just 
override the car’s interest. Animals, although living and thus distinct 
from non-living property like a car, are labeled and treated as property 
and so long as animals are treated as property they will suffer the 
injustice of having their interests ignored by humans, even in cases in 
which the interest at stake is the interest in being free from 
unnecessary harm or cruelty. 
In order for the disparity between the acceptance of the humane 
treatment principle and the practice of the principle to be fixed, 
Francione argues that the status of animals must be changed from 
that of human property to that of persons79 whose interests are worthy 
of equal consideration with any human interest.80  Francione arrives at 
this conclusion by systematically refuting various attempts to draw a 
relevant distinction between human persons and animals, including 
mental capacities, interest in continued existence, self-awareness and 
                                                                                                                       
environment do not seem analogous to cases involving protection of 
private property like animals. 
 
79 What Francione means by person is a being that cannot be used as a 
mere means, or the opposite of a thing.  
 
80 Gary L Francione, “Animals: Property or Persons?” 131. 
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use of language, and by appealing to another commonly accepted 
principle, the principle of equal consideration or principle of equality. 
According to this principle relevantly similar cases are to be treated 
the same and since there is not a relevant distinction between humans, 
then we ought to treat cases of animal suffering the same as human 
suffering. Francione further claims that the only way that animal 
interest in not suffering will be treated with equal consideration is if 
animals are treated as persons and granted the right not be treated as 
a means to an end. 
More Objections to Rights Based Views 
Both Francione and Regan claim that animals have rights that 
put them on an equal footing with humans with respect to being used 
as a means to an end, but one might wonder just how far the rights 
view forces humans to go in their treatment of animals. Specifically 
one might object that granting animals rights that we have historically 
only associated with humans would entail the ridiculous requirement 
that animals be given the right to vote or own firearms or that wild 
animals should be policed and penalized for actions that humans 
consider criminal such as stealing from or killing one another. 
However, both philosophers are quick to point out that their views only 
advocate treating animals as beings with the right to not be treated as 
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things for human use, not that animals should be given all the rights 
that humans have or treated exactly the same as any rational adult 
human.81 Regan and Francione argue that we ought to treat animals 
as being worthy of respect as living things that are not mere means, 
but admitting that an animal has the right not to be used does not 
entail that the animal has the right to vote any more than accepting 
the right that a two year old child has not to be used entails that the 
child has a right to vote. Likewise the acceptance of animals having 
the right not to be used creates a duty for human beings who 
understand the concept of rights, to refrain from treating animals as a 
means, but it does not require that humans police the animal kingdom. 
Animals do not understand the concept of rights, nor could they, and 
therefore do not have the moral or legal duty to treat other animals as 
having the right not be used and humans do not have a duty to protect 
the rights of one animal against another.  
Another worry that one might have is that the rights based 
approach fails to appreciate some distinctions between humans and 
animals that are not dependent on equally relevant interests, mental 
capacities or some other sort of shared biology. Most people accept that 
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killing another innocent person is wrong and that biological 
characteristics such as being able to feel pain contribute to the 
wrongness of killing a human and that animals have many of the 
biological characteristics that contribute to the wrongness of killing a 
person. Most people also accept that biological distinctions between 
people do not affect the wrongness of killing a person, ie whether one is 
tall, short, black, white, thin, fat, male or female makes no difference 
with respect to the wrongness of killing. However, these same people 
might also claim that although the ability to feel pain contributes to 
the wrongness of killing a person, it is not the main reason that killing 
a person is wrong.   
Cora Diamond claims that there is something distinctive about a 
human person that all of people understand and that this distinction is 
made clear when we think about eating an animal that has died of 
natural causes after having lived a good long life in comparison to 
eating a human that has died after having lived a good long life.82 
Arguments against killing animals in order to eat them, like Regan’s 
or Singer’s or Francione’s view, all appeal to a principle of equality 
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between cases of human suffering and cases of animal suffering, and 
conclude that humans ought to treat cases of animal suffering equally 
with relevantly similar cases of human suffering. None of these 
theories argues for a moral prohibition against eating the flesh of 
animal that has died of natural causes. That one has no moral duty not 
to eat the flesh of an animal that has died of natural causes does not 
seem strange at all to most people, even those who accept the 
arguments against killing animals for food.  Diamond calls attention to 
a disparity that is confounding for animal rights arguments that turn 
on the equivalence principle, namely that while most everyone agrees 
that it is morally acceptable to eat the flesh of animal that has died of 
natural causes, it is never morally ok to eat the flesh of a dead human, 
regardless of the cause of death. Diamond claims that there is 
something contained within our understanding of what it means to be 
a human that prohibits us from ever viewing humans as a source of 
food and that this prohibition is not built into our understanding of 
what it means to be an animal.83 Diamond also asserts that this extra 
stuff built into what it means to be a human person, as opposed to an 
animal, is also the reason why we hold funerals for people and not dogs 
and why we would judge a slave owner who, on his deathbed, released 
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his human slaves as benevolent and a cow owner who released his 
cows on his deathbed as crazy.84 However, this fact about human 
psychology does not do the work that Diamond thinks it does.  
Diamond highlights an intuition or belief that many people have 
in order to refute the claim of rights based arguments that it is wrong 
to kill animals for food, but despite her claim to the contrary,85 this 
distinction in the way that we view humans and the way that we view 
animals seems to be speciesist. Diamond claims that there is a 
relevant distinction between humans and animals, but provides no 
specific relevant reason for thinking this is the case. She is correct that 
people accept the food label for animal flesh and reject the label of food 
for human flesh, but that people do so is not a good reason to think 
that there is a relevant difference between humans and animals.  
Many actual views about how humans ought to treat animals 
seem, or just are, speciesist in the sense that the distinctions used to 
justify treating animal interests different than similar human 
interests are just unjustifiably arbitrary preferences for our own 
species, but many people also have no problem being speciesist and do 
not accept that speciesism is morally comparable to racism or sexism.  
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Such people claim that although empirical evidence has refuted most 
of the claimed distinctions between humans and animals, that there is 
still nothing wrong with favoring human interests over animal 
interests. Such people might even accept the view that animals have 
certain rights, such as the right not to be unnecessarily harmed, but 
that many of the ways in which we use animals really are necessary or 
are better than any alternative. Take for example the case of medical 
experimentation on animals in research laboratories. Some people 
might claim that in order to protect the human right to be free from 
unnecessary harm human researchers are required do painful 
experiments on animals so that current or future humans can be 
spared the pain associated with a disease like cancer, because testing 
on animals is the only way to learn how to treat human disease or that 
animal testing is the best of all the possible alternatives including 
voluntary human testing and computer modeling. It is obvious that 
using animal testing is neither the only way to learn how to cure 
human disease, nor is it the best way when compared to testing on 
voluntary human subjects, but many people still have no moral qualms 
about using animals as test subjects and in fact praise the medical 
progress our species has made as a result of using animals as a means 
to our ends. I can think of no reply that would convince a person who 
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refuses to acknowledge the moral turpitude of holding the speciesist 
belief that animals have no right to not be used as means to further 
human end while relevantly similar humans do, and I further admit 
that I feel little reason to try to convince anyone who has suffered, or 
has known someone who has suffered, from cancer that using animals 
as test subjects for procedures that may cure cancer is a serious moral 
wrong. However, what I would argue, and what I believe most anyone 
would agree to, is that animals have a right to be free from use that is 
cruel, tortuous, or neglectful.  
The rights based view provides the strongest reasons in support 
of the common belief that animals are worthy of moral consideration 
that is owed directly to the animal and the rights view seems to be the 
most consistent with how humans treat other humans, but this type of 
view also has the strictest and most far reaching requirements for 
human interaction with animals, some of which may seem too extreme 
for most people to accept. Many people are just unwilling to accept that 
animals have a right not be used as a source of food that humans 
evolved to eat or that there is anything wrong with doing painful 
testing on mice in order to cure cancer. Such people might be making 
some mistakes about the degree to which evolution has a say in ethical 
matters or how necessary animal testing is to curing human disease, 
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but even if one rejects some of the more extreme obligations of rights 
based views, one could surely agree to the claim that animals have the 
right not to be treated with cruelty by humans or to be neglected by 
humans who have at some point chosen to take care of the animal.  
Animal Law History 
 Up to this point I have outlined what I think are the best ethical 
theories and some objections to those theories and have claimed that 
each of these theories agrees that humans should not be cruel to 
animals, but I will now shift my focus from ethics to the law and 
likewise argue that the law also agrees that humans should not be 
cruel to animals. I will begin my exploration of animal law by 
sketching a brief history of it.  
 Up until the 1600’s animals were not considered proper targets 
for legal protection, but just as philosophers in this period began to 
take the ethical consideration of animals more seriously so too did the 
law. Legal protection for animals was long thought by law scholars to 
have begun with the passing of Richard Martin’s Cruel Treatment of 
Cattle Act in 1822, but Thomas Wentworth’s Act against Plowing by 
the Tayle, and Pulling the Wool off Living Sheep, 1635 Ireland and 
Nathaniel Ward’s Off the Bruite Creatures, Liberty 92 and 93 in The 
Body of Liberties of 1641 Massachusetts Colony, are the first official 
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animal cruelty laws86 of England and America.87 The language of these 
early laws suggests that the obligations that humans had to animals 
were at best indirect,88 but these laws broke ground in sanctioning 
legal punishment for abuse of common livestock of the time, and set 
the stage for a much richer body of animal law that would follow in the 
coming centuries. 
Over the course of the next 80 years English public and legal 
beliefs about the value of animals began to change and Martin’s Act 
was modified to better fit these changing beliefs. In 1835 Martin’s Act 
was changed to the Cruelty to Animals Act and updated to include 
punishment for baiting or fighting any animal and to widen the scope 
of punishment for animal cruelty (which included wanton beating, 
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negligence and torture) to encompass all domestic animals.89 In just 13 
years, English law had come to recognize that nearly all animals 
deserved to be protected from cruel treatment by humans, and even 
though the punishment was a small monetary fine the message that 
animal suffering mattered was clear.  The Cruelty to Animals Act was 
updated again in 1850 and 1854, to provide imprisonment as a possible 
punishment for animal cruelty and in 1879 the act was amended to 
cover animals used as test subjects for research. In 1900, a final 
amendment of the act was made to the effect that “Any person shall be 
guilty of an offence who, whilst an animal is in captivity or close 
confinement, or is maimed, pinioned, or subjected to any appliance or 
contrivance for the purpose of hindering or preventing its escape from 
such captivity or confinement, shall, by wantonly or unreasonably 
doing or omitting any act,… cause or permit to be caused any 
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unnecessary suffering to such animal; or cruelly abuse, infuriate, 
tease, or terrify it, or permit it to be so treated.”90  
While Martin’s Act was being amended in England, Henry 
Bergh began leading the charge for legal animal protection in the 
United States.91 Bergh started in New York, creating the American 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) in 1866, and 
due largely to his efforts New York passed “An act for the more 
effectual prevention of cruelty to animals,” in 1867. This act stated, “If 
any person shall over-drive, over-load, torture, torment, deprive of 
necessary sustenance, or unnecessarily or cruelly beat, or needlessly 
mutilate or kill, or cause or procure to be to be over-driven, over-
loaded, tortured, tormented or deprived of necessary sustenance, or to 
be unnecessarily or cruelly beaten, or needlessly mutilated, or killed as 
aforesaid any living creature, every such offender shall, for every such 
offence, be guilty of a misdemeanor.”92 The act also provided further 
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conditions for penalizing animal fighting, animal negligence, animal 
abandonment and the use of dogs as vehicles. A similar version of this 
law was soon passed by most of the North Eastern States and today 
every US state has an animal cruelty law similar to the New York act 
of 187693 and in 35 states animal cruelty is a felony offense.94  
Anti-cruelty laws constituted most of the animal laws that were 
passed in the US up until 1958. In this year the Humane Slaughter 
Act was passed, which was unique in a few ways. First, this act created 
legal recognition of an animal’s interest in not dying in specific ways 
and it was the first federal animal protection law. The act specifies 
that animals used for food are to be, “…rendered insensible to pain by 
a single blow or gunshot or an electrical, chemical or other means that 
is rapid and effective, before being shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or 
cut; or by slaughtering in accordance with the ritual requirements of 
the Jewish faith or any other religious faith that prescribes a method 
                                                                                                                       
92 “An act for the more effectual prevention of cruelty to animals,” in 
New York Revised Statutes 1867: Chapter 375: Sections 1-10, Animal 
Legal and Historical Center, web accessed on 3/1/2012, 
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of slaughter whereby the animal suffers loss of consciousness by 
anemia of the brain caused by the simultaneous and instantaneous 
severance of the carotid arteries with a sharp instrument and handling 
in connection with such slaughtering.”95 So while the act asserted that 
humans have a duty to treat animals in a humane way, even when 
killing them, the act also made an exemption for the practice of kosher 
slaughter. This exemption would spark a new beginning for animal law 
in the United States. 
In 1972, Henry Mark Holzer, with support from the Humane 
Society of the United States (HSUS), filed a lawsuit against the 
Humane Slaughter Act on the basis that the act’s special exemption of 
kosher slaughter methods violated the Establishment and Free Exercise 
Clauses of the First Amendment of the US constitution.96 Holzer’s suit 
was ultimately unsuccessful, but his bold move, coupled with the release 
of Singer’s Animal Liberation in 1975, got other lawyers and institutions 
interested enough in animals to start making moves of their own.  
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The first animal rights law course was taught in 1977 and in the 
next year a group of attorneys from the San Francisco area formed 
Attorneys for Animal Rights (AFAR), which would later become known as 
the Animal Legal Defense Fund.97 For the first time animals had a group 
of professional lawyers who were intent on serving as champions for 
animal rights and these lawyers were not afraid to attack human 
interests that resulted in animal harm. Animals had unquestionably been 
the ideal test subjects for medical and scientific research for a long time 
prior to the formation of AFAR, but in 1981, the newly formed group of 
animal lawyers filed a criminal suit against Dr. Edward Taub accusing 
Dr. Taub of treating the monkeys he used in his research in cruel and 
inhumane ways.98 This suit brought the seemingly pristine scientific use 
of animals for research under the legal and ethical spotlight and also was 
one of the first major suits to appeal to the newly enacted federal Animal 
Welfare Act of 1966. This act was created to “… insure that animals 
intended for use in research facilities or for exhibition purposes or for use 
as pets are provided humane care and treatment; to assure the humane 
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98 Dr. Taub’s cruelty included keeping the monkeys in tiny cages and 
failing to clean the cages so that the monkeys were forced to sit in their 
own feces, feeding the monkeys with inedible food and failure to 
provide proper veterinary care for the monkeys. 
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treatment of animals during transportation in commerce; and to protect 
the owners of animals from the theft of their animals by preventing the 
sale or use of animals which have been stolen.”99 Taub was convicted on 
one charge of failure to provide proper veterinary care at the circuit court 
level, but this charge was later overturned by an appellate court.100  
Although many of the initial suits brought against cases of animal 
cruelty met with failure, this did not stop the growing number of lawyers 
sympathetic to the plight of animals in this country from mounting new 
cases and spreading information about the legal status of animals. In 
1985, the ALDF filed a lawsuit against the Department of Environmental 
Conservation (DEC) for the use of cruel leg traps for trapping animals.101  
The very next year members of the ALDF Boston chapter filed a lawsuit 
against the Provimi Corporation claiming that the corporation’s practice 
of total confinement of the veal calves was a violation of Massachusetts’s 
anti-cruelty laws.102 Also in 1986, the ALDF teamed up with the Humane 
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Society of Rochester to win one of their first suits against the cruel 
practice of branding the faces of dairy cows.103 In addition to the ever 
increasing number of cases involving protection of animal interests being 
filed, the first “Animal Law Report” was established in 1984, as an official 
report of the American Bar Association’s Animal Protection Committee. 
This report provided case information and information pertaining to new 
advances within animal law to the legal community, and today there exist 
numerous peer reviewed journals that are specifically focused on animal 
law and policy.  
A Disparity in Current Animal Law 
 It should be apparent from examining the history of animal law 
that people care about animal interests and that the law, in recognition of 
this fact, has been used, is being used, and will continue to be used as a 
way of protecting some animal interests from human abuse. Currently the 
law, at the state level via anti-cruelty laws and at the national level via 
the humane slaughter and animal welfare acts, is used to protect the 
interests of many animals in not being subjected to cruel, neglectful or 
tortuous treatment by human beings, by providing increasingly stiffer 
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penalties for instances of animal cruelty.104 Legal and moral philosophers 
are also arguing for new and more effective means of protecting many 
other animal interests105 and for a new legal status for animal as either a 
special kind of property,106 or even to treat animals as persons.107  Like 
the ethical theories about human obligations to animals, the legal theories 
about what the law owes to animals do not agree on a comprehensive list 
of all the animal interests that the law should protect, but all legal 
theories at least accept that the law should be used to protect animals 
from human cruelty (as evidenced by the fact that every state has an anti-
cruelty law for animals and that the federal government has a similar law 
in the form of the Animal Welfare Act). However, while the law and the 
most plausible ethical theories agree that human beings should not be 
cruel to animals, there is a surprising disparity within the law between a 
group of animals that is actually protected from cruelty and another 
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group of equally important animals whose interest in being protected from 
cruelty is either paid a lip service or outright ignored.  
 The disparity is between the pets, research and zoo/aquarium 
animals who receive at least some legal protection from cruelty and the 
animals raised for food, otherwise known as farm animals. All states have 
animal cruelty laws that define cruelty along lines similar to the 
following, “ ’Cruelty to animals’ includes mistreatment of any animal or 
neglect of any animal under the care and control of the neglector, whereby 
unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain or suffering is caused. By way 
of example this includes: Unjustifiable beating of an animal; overworking 
an animal; tormenting an animal; abandonment of an animal; failure to 
feed properly or give proper shelter or veterinary care to an animal.”108 
One might wonder how much protection animals are actually afforded 
given the liberal requirement for an act to be cruel as being “unjustifiable” 
from a human perspective, but despite that worry one might also applaud 
the law’s attempts to provide real protection for animals by providing 
harsh penalties (including fines for thousands of dollars or multiple years 
of jail time in more extreme instances) for cases of animal abuse.  But, 
read a little further in any state animal cruelty law and you will likely 
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find the following sort of exemption,109 “The provisions of [this law] shall 
not apply to: With respect to farm animals, normal or accepted practices 
of animal husbandry,”110 that is preceded and followed by a notable 
absence of reasons for the exemption. The Animal Welfare Act also has 
effectively the same exemption built into its definition of “animal”:  
The term “animal” means any live or dead dog, cat, monkey 
(nonhuman primate mammal), guinea pig, hamster, rabbit, or 
such other warm-blooded animal, as the Secretary may 
determine is being used, or is intended for use, for research, 
testing, experimentation, or exhibition purposes, or as a pet; but 
such term excludes (1) birds, rats of the genus Rattus, and mice 
of the genus Mus, bred for use in research, (2) horses not used 
for research purposes, and (3) other farm animals, such as, but 
not limited to livestock or poultry, used or intended for use as 
food or fiber, or livestock or poultry used or intended for use for 
improving animal nutrition, breeding, management, or 
production efficiency, or for improving the quality of food or 
fiber.111 
 
These unreasoned exemptions should temper one’s respect for the law as a 
protector of animals and strike one as odd, especially given the following 
statistics: Of the approximately 9.7 billion animals that die annually in 
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the US, ~9.5 billion are farm animals.112 This means that the lives of the 
overwhelming majority of the animals that humans interact with are 
ignored by animal cruelty laws without reason. One might here object 
that there is a reason that the farm animals are not recognized by animal 
cruelty laws and that is because farm animals are either covered by 
further regulations in the form of “common farming practices” and/or are 
covered by the Humane Slaughter Act. This claim, however, proves 
unfounded.  
 To begin with, there is no regulation on “common farming 
practices” or how one should treat “commonly farmed animals”. A list of 
what these practices are or what they ought to be simply does not exist113 
and so the farming industry effectively makes up its own regulations as it 
goes along. Second, the Humane Slaughter Act is meant to protect farm 
animals from being killed in cruel ways, but it fails utterly in its intention 
for the following reasons. First the act makes an exemption for the cruel 
practice of kosher slaughter in which an animal has its throat cut without 
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anesthetic and dies by bleeding out or suffocating. Second the penalties, 
which include fines up to $500,000 and/or up to 10 years of jail time, for 
killing a farm animal in a cruel way are never enforced.114 Third animals 
which are unable to walk, for whatever reason including having their legs 
broken in the process of being moved to or within a slaughter house, are 
not covered by the act. Lastly the act does also not cover any chicken, 
turkeys, geese and ducks, which account for ~8.5billion of the ~9.5billion 
farm animals that are killed annually. In addition it seems obvious that 
farm animals have an interest in being free from cruelty not just at the 
moment of their death, but also during the much greater expanse of time 
in which they are alive. The Humane Slaughter Act makes no attempt to 
protect animals from cruelty in life.  
 The Humane Slaughter Act provides little to no protection against 
cruelty for farmed animals, and put simply farm animals seem not to be 
considered worthy of legal protection. But surely a good reason must exist 
for considering the interests of a small group of animals and ignoring the 
interests of a much larger group? How else could the law justify protecting 
pet, zoo/aquarium and research animals from cruelty, but not farm 
animals? These are the sorts of questions that one is forced to confront 
after having examined the animal cruelty laws, but, as I will argue, the 
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good reason for not protecting farm animals remains a mystery and this 
lack of a good reason should force the state and federal law making bodies 
to reconsider their positions on ignoring the basic interests of farm 
animals.  
Equal Protection for Equally Relevant Animals   
 My argument is conditional on the acceptance of four points:  the 
acceptance of the claim that human beings should not be cruel to 
animals and that this human obligation to animals should be enforced 
by the law via animal cruelty laws, the acceptance of the claim that 
farm animals are relevantly similar to the other animals protected by 
animal cruelty laws, the acceptance of the principle of equality, and 
the acceptance of the claim that laws must be enforced in order to be a 
law. Acceptance of these four points leads one to the irrefutable 
conclusion that the exemptions within animal cruelty laws for farm 
animals should be erased and that animal cruelty laws that do include 
farm animals need to be better enforced. But before I lay out my 
argument I want to clarify the scope of what I’m arguing. I am 
interested in the disparity within animal cruelty laws between a 
privileged group of animals and farm animals, and while my argument 
for equal treatment could be extended to include wild animals, and no 
doubt it should be, this is not my goal in this paper.  Wild animals are 
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certainly relevantly like non-wild animals with respect to their 
capacity to be harmed and their interest in not being treated with 
cruelty, but because wild animals are not treated as human property 
by the law a distinction might be drawn between those animals living 
wild lives and the human owned animals that are typically thought of 
as the proper targets of animal cruelty laws. It is my personal belief 
that every person has a strong moral reason not to be cruel to wild 
animals, but given the current legal emphasis on animals as property 
it is unclear how this moral reason can be translated into a restrictive 
law and for this reason wild animals are beyond the scope of the 
argument I present here.  Having made this clarification I will now 
describe my argument and deal with possible objections that might be 
raised against it.  
Our best ethical and legal theories all agree that humans should 
not be cruel to animals. Nearly all reasonable people also accept that 
humans should not be cruel to animals and that the law should be 
used to enforce this obligation. In addition empirical science and 
rational inquiry provide reasons to believe that there is no relevant 
legal or moral difference between farm animals and the animals that 
are protected by animal cruelty laws. Now recall from my discussion of 
Gary L. Francione’s view that according to the plausible and widely 
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accepted principle of equality we are morally and rationally required to 
treat relevantly similar the cases equally. According to this principle if 
we judged that Suzy had done something immoral by shoplifting from 
a store it would be irrational for us to judge that her equally situated 
friend Bob acted morally by shoplifting for the same reasons and 
further it would undermine our theory of morality by allowing such 
irrational inconsistency.  This same principle is accepted and used by 
the law in order to insure that relevantly similar cases are treated 
equally. Without such a principle of equality Bob might be punished 
for intentional shoplifting by spending 40 days in jail and Suzy might 
receive 2 years as punishment for the same crime, due to the irrelevant 
fact that Suzy is a woman and Bob is a man. A further universally 
accepted and plausible requirement of any meaningful law is that 
punishment for breaking the law is both actually and consistently 
enforced, because otherwise the law fails in what it purports to do and 
is for practical purposes meaningless. Most of the animal cruelty laws 
at the federal and state level violate not only the important principle of 
equality  by making an irrelevant exemption for farm animals in being 
protected from cruelty, but are also so inconsistently enforced with 
respect to farm animals that the laws that purport to protect farm 
animals from cruelty are meaningless. This violation and shortcoming 
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of animal cruelty laws cannot stand and the only way to reconcile these 
failures of the laws is to change the laws so that they do not exclude 
the largest group of animals that humans interact with and to 
stringently enforce the law in any case that involves cruelty to 
animals. This is my argument in its barest form and although most of 
the key points in my argument are already widely accepted; there are 
still objections that might arise dealing with the relevant similarity 
between farm animals and the other animals that humans interact 
with, the existence of cruelty to farm animals, the purpose or business 
of the law, the possible problematic entailments of the principle of 
equality, or the role of actual enforcement in the efficacy of a law. The 
rest of this paper will be dedicated to refuting these objections.  
Despite the scientific and commonsense evidence that farm 
animals are not relevantly morally or legally different than pet, 
zoo/aquarium, or research animals,115 one might still try to make the 
case that there is a significant difference between these two groups. 
One might claim, for instance, that a relevant difference between farm 
animals and other animals is that farm animals are intended to be 
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animals and the other groups of animals covered by animal cruelty 
laws.  
 87 
used as food for humans. This unique, but arbitrary,116 end of farm 
animals, one might additionally claim, justifies using any means, 
including cruel ones, to achieve that end and thus farm animals need 
not be covered by animal cruelty laws.  However, while it could be 
argued that an end justifies a means in some cases, such as harming 
one person in order to save a million people from death, in the case of 
using animals as human food, an end which is not necessary for 
human life, it cannot be the case that feeding humans justifies being 
subjected to cruelty. Imagine that a person was raising a cat or dog 
with the intention of eating the cat or dog. Now ask yourself, “Would it 
be morally or legally ok for that person to torture the cat or dog by 
slowly skinning it alive, inch by inch, just because the person intends 
to eat the dog or cat when they are done torturing it?” I think not and I 
assume that every other moral and law abiding person thinks the same 
thing. The law, furthermore, makes no such distinction with respect to 
the animals that are protected by animal cruelty laws.117 Given the 
widespread acceptance of the claim that it would be morally and 
legally wrong to torture a pet animal just because one intended to eat 
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it, it cannot be the case that intending to eat something is a morally or 
legally relevant reason for differentiating between groups of animals. 
Here one might object that it is not the case that farm animals are 
arbitrarily intended to be used as a food, but that their actual purpose, 
as something innate to farm animals or as a result of evolution plus 
human engineering, is to be used as food for humans and that this is a 
relevant difference between farm animals and the other animals. 
However, the claim that farm animals have the innate purpose is 
either empirically false or unverifiable and that they have been 
designed by humans to be used as food is no reason to think that they 
can be treated with cruelty.  
Farm animals are naturally, in the biological or evolutionary 
sense, meant to live and procreate in the way that any other animal 
lives and procreates and it was the result of an arbitrary choice by 
humans that current farm animals are used as human food.118  
Additionally, it is true that farm animals have been designed by 
humans, through the process of gene selection and the use of drugs, to 
be well suited for use as human food, but this does not justify cruelty 
any more than intending to eat something justifies cruelty. Humans 
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may create the purpose for artifacts, but farm animals are not artifact, 
they are natural living things and humans cannot simply create the 
purpose for a natural living thing.119 Still one other distinction that 
one might attempt to make between farm animals and the rest is that 
people care about pet, zoo/aquarium, and research animals, but not 
farm animals. This claim, like the claim that farm animals have the 
purpose of being food is just false. People obviously care about farm 
animals as evidence by the work of PETA, Peter Singer, the ALDF and 
numerous other groups and individuals. People who object to including 
farm animals under the umbrella of protection afforded by animal 
cruelty laws can certainly provide some reasons for thinking that there 
is a relevant distinction between farm animals and the rest, but what 
is needed to justify such a distinction is not just any reasons, but good 
reasons. There are no good reasons for thinking that farm animals are 
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relevantly different than pet, zoo/aquarium, or research animals and 
absent any good reason one should be forced to reject this objection. 
Another route that one might take in objecting to farm animal 
inclusion in animal cruelty laws is that such inclusion is unnecessary. 
One could claim that such an inclusion is unnecessary, because farm 
animals are not actually subjected to any cruelty by humans. But, in 
making this claim one has to be committed to claiming that the 
following non-isolated practices are not cruel: keeping veal calves  and 
pigs in crates so small that they cannot turn around,120 searing or 
cutting the beaks off of chicks and chickens,121 suffocating male chicks 
by the hundreds in trash bags simply throwing them alive into a 
grinder,122 cutting the testicles off of piglets without the use of 
anesthetic,123 refusing veterinary care to elderly farm animals or 
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animals that will soon be slaughtered anyway,124 constantly 
impregnating dairy cows and then immediately separating the 
emotionally attached mothers from their calves,125 slitting the throats 
of cows and pigs and allowing them to suffocate or bleed out as a 
result,126 packing chickens into sunless sheds so tightly that the birds 
cannot move and may be trampled or suffocated by other chickens,127 
not allowing pigs or chickens access to the natural world outside of a 
shed,128  allowing cattle to die by the thousands in overcrowded, 
muddied, feces covered,  and shade-less stock yards from heat stroke 
and disease,129 ripping the head off of a live chicken and writing 
graffiti with its blood or squeezing it like a balloon until it sprays feces 
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out its backside,130 and so on. To claim that the aforementioned 
common practices and acts do not qualify as cruel, or even tortuous in 
some cases, is ridiculous, rationally indefensible and clearly false. The 
practices that I listed, and many others that I did not, are undeniably 
harmful to farm animals and are also unnecessary, as the reasons 
these reprehensible things are done is to save a few cents towards the 
cost of raising the animals or to satisfy some sadistic urge. Of all the 
objections against my argument, this is the worst and should not only 
be ignored, but militantly refuted.  
No relevant difference exists between farm animals and other 
animals protected by animal cruelty laws and it is clear that all kinds 
of farm animals are subjected to acts of terrible cruelty on a regular 
basis. These paths for objecting to my claim that farm animals should 
be included in state and federal animal cruelty laws are fruitless, but 
the resolute defender of farm animal exemption might take a different 
approach for rejecting my claim by focusing on the general purpose of 
the law or by attempting to show that the principle of equality has 
absurd entailments.  
                                            
130 Jim Mason and Peter Singer, The Ethics of What We Eat: Why Our 
Food Choices Matter, 27. 
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The purpose of the law is a contested subject and critics of my 
view might claim that the law does not have any business in protecting 
farm animals or animals in general. Such critics may draw from the 
theory of contractarianism and claim that the purpose of the law is 
only to protect the interests and well-being of the humans who create 
and maintain the law. Animals, they might claim, fall outside the 
scope of the law and thus the law should not interfere with how 
humans interact with animals. The first claim seems false given the 
acceptance of the valid application of some laws to all societies 
regardless of whether a society actually has the law,131 but supposing 
that this conception of the law is correct, would such a conception rule 
out any laws regarding human and animal interaction? The answer is 
no. If the purpose of the law is to protect human interest and well-
being the law would still have a valid interest in regulating human 
interaction with animals. To see why imagine the following case. Sally 
has a pet cat that she adores and Sally’s life is made more enjoyable as 
a result of the companionship that her cat provides her. Now further 
suppose that Sally’s neighbor, Jim, just hates cats and so one day 
                                            
131 Here I’m imagining laws against murder, rape, slavery, etc. that we 
apply to any society, including societies that do not actually have such 
laws. Many laws that the US created and maintains are not created 
and maintained by other societies, but we still enforce such laws on the 
other societies.  
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decides to cut off one of the legs of Sally’s cat. I think it would be safe 
to assume that Sally would be grieved by Jim’s action and her well-
being would be wounded by the harming of her feline companion. Sally, 
like most actual pet owners, has an interest in protecting her cat from 
cruel, unnecessary harm and her well-being is tied up with the cat’s 
well-being. We could further assume that even if Sally wanted Jim to 
cut off her cat’s leg or if Sally cut off her cat’s leg that the law could 
legitimately be used to protect Sally’s cat. We could make such an 
assumption, because it seems highly plausible to suspect that Sally’s 
pet loving neighbors, or some other pro-animal protection group, would 
have an interest in protecting Sally’s cat from such unnecessary harm. 
So the law, as a protector of human interests and well-being, would 
have a valid use in protecting not only Sally’s cat from cruel and 
sadistic neighbors like Jim, but all animals that people have an 
interest in, and should therefore take the necessary steps to effectively 
protect animals from cruelty. The protection of animals would not be 
owed directly to animals according to a view of the law that maintains 
that only human interests and well-being should be protected, but 
animals would still be within the scope of the law so long as humans 
had an interest in them, and since it is an empirical fact that humans 
have an interest in protecting pet, zoo/aquarium, research and farm 
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animals from cruelty it follows that the law would, just as it actually 
does, have an authentic interest in protecting animals.  
A crucial premise of my argument is that the principle of 
equality is a principle that we ought to accept for legal and moral 
assessment and action. I take it that any rational person would readily 
accept such a principle, but an especially suspicious person might 
worry that the principle commits one to a ridiculous conclusion, 
namely that we treat all moral and legal cases the same. The reasons 
for this worry might proceed as follows: the principle of equality claims 
that we ought to treat like cases alike, or in other words, not 
differentiate cases based on arbitrary or irrelevant distinctions, any 
distinctions between people and animals are arbitrary or irrelevant, 
and therefore we should treat animals exactly like people. The line of 
reasoning will continue with the following sort of claim: that we should 
treat a chicken exactly like a rational adult human being is just 
absurd, and since this is what is required by the principle of equality 
we should reject the principle. I agree that treating a chicken exactly 
like a rational adult human would be absurd. Granting chickens the 
right to vote or to marry, requiring that chickens get a basic education, 
expecting them to work, pay taxes, and so on would just be silly and no 
one would agree that chickens ought to be granted these rights or be 
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expected to perform such action. The principle of equality does not 
commit one to such a ridiculous view. The worry in this case is 
unfounded, because the principle admits that we should different cases 
that have relevant differences and in the case of animals and humans 
many of the ways in which treat humans, but not animals, is the result 
of a relevant difference. Adult humans are granted the right to vote 
and marry based on capacities that humans have, namely rationality 
and autonomy, that animals do not have and this difference in 
capacities is significant and thus it is no violation of the principle of 
equality to treat humans as having these rights and not animals. 
Likewise with our expectations about what humans are to do and what 
animals are to do. We expect or require adult humans to go to school 
and receive a basic education in their youth, we also expect or require 
adult humans to find productive jobs and pay taxes, but we form these 
expectations based on the assumption that adult humans have certain 
capacities that allow them to do these things and that not only society, 
but also individual adult humans are better off for doing these things. 
Animals lack the capacities that would allow them to learn at a 
primary school, (with perhaps the exception of some species of apes) 
hold a job or pay taxes and we justifiably think that neither our society 
nor the lives of animals would be made better off by expecting or 
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requiring animals to hold jobs, pay taxes and go to school.  The 
principle of equality requires that we treat relevantly similar cases 
equally. In instances of unnecessary animal suffering requires that we 
treat cases in which a pet animal suffers unnecessarily the same as 
cases in which farm animals suffer unnecessarily, but it does not 
require that we treat a case involving a human not paying taxes the 
same as a case of an animal not paying taxes.  
One final objection I’d like to entertain is one leveled at my 
claim that a law must be enforced and enforced consistently in order 
for it to actually be a law. I take it that a person who would raise such 
an objection would not refute the claim that a law must be effective to 
actually be a law (what would the purpose of having laws be if not to 
have some effect on behavior or action?), but would claim that the 
threat of punishment is often enough for a law to be effective and it is 
therefore not necessary for the consequences of breaking a law to 
actually be enforced for the law to be efficacious. I can imagine cases in 
which the mere threat of some horrific punishment would deter anyone 
from breaking a law, such as in the case of a law against skipping to 
work which had death by boiling as punishment, but clearly not every 
law is effective using only the threat of punishment and all it would 
take to for such an imagined law to lose its efficacy is for a few people 
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to break the law and go unpunished. Statistically some people are 
bound to break such a law at some point, because people are not legal 
saints who just blindly follow the law, and then the punishment of the 
law must be carried out, if the law is to remain effective. So for any 
law, animal cruelty laws included, punishment must be enforced when 
the law is broken, if the law is to be a law at all, and with respect to 
animal cruelty laws this includes enforcing the punishment of 
significant monetary fines and/or jail time.   
Additionally, I claim that a law must not only be enforced, but 
that it must also be enforced consistently in order to be a valid law. 
This claim follows from the view that laws must be effective and the 
idea that any valid law also includes a principle of justice and/or 
equality, which requires that if person A is, or should be, punished for 
committing crime D and person B commits the same crime D, then 
person B should be punished for crime D. So part of the reason that a 
law must be enforced consistently is for the sake of making the law 
effective in its role as a behavior modifier, and I think it is fairly 
obvious that if a law is not enforced consistently, then it will also lose 
its efficacy. If an instance of animal cruelty was punished in Alabama 
on Monday, but not on Tuesday, Thursday, Friday or Saturday, then 
people who stood to gain from animal cruelty would quickly become 
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undeterred by the law against animal cruelty and the law would cease 
to be effective. But, another reason that the law must be enforced 
consistently is to satisfy the requirement of justice. If small farmer 
Fred commits an act of animal cruelty and is legally punished for it, 
but big farmer Bruce commits the same act of cruelty and is not 
punished, then justice has failed to be satisfied and so too has the law. 
Justice requires that relevantly similar cases deserve equal 
punishment and if animal cruelty laws are enforced only on small 
farms, but not on the massive industrial farms, then the animal 
cruelty laws are unjust and therefore invalid.  
Farm Animal Protection: Acceptance and Practical Implications 
 Having read my argument and my refutation of some likely 
objections, I hope that my reader will have come to the conclusion that 
farm animals should be included in state and federal animal cruelty 
laws. I further hope that my reader will see the need for making some 
serious changes not only to the animal cruelty laws themselves, but 
also the enforcement of these laws and to the influence that big 
agricultural lobbies have on animal cruelty laws.  These needed 
changes, however, will be radical and met with much resistance. 
 Animal cruelty laws have their irrelevant farm animal 
exemptions, because an enormously powerful lobby has an interest in 
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such exemptions. Big agriculture spends millions of dollars each year 
lobbying state and federal legislatures to promote their interests132 and 
have various members of the lobby stationed within the regulatory 
agencies of the US.133 This lobby does not want animal cruelty laws 
changed to include farm animals or to have significant penalties 
imposed for breaking animal cruelty laws for economic reasons, but 
rationally and morally they can provide no good reason for not 
including farm animals or for desiring insignificant penalties for 
breaking animal cruelty laws. Animal cruelty laws need to be amended 
to include farm animals and the punishment for breaking these laws 
needs to be significant, ie the punishment should be large monetary 
fines for each instance of cruelty or years of jail time. Standing up to 
the big agriculture lobbies and making these changes will require 
activism on the part of voters, responsible representation by elected 
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officials and reduction in hesitancy by the courts to pass judgment on 
illogical and immoral disparities in the law. 
 Furthermore, animal cruelty laws will have to be far more 
consistently enforced than they currently are.  This will require the 
creation of regulatory bodies, independent of the farming industry, 
charged with setting standards for the practices that can be carried out 
on farms and the creation of inspection units that verify whether or not 
farms actually comply with these standards. Local law and federal law 
enforcement agencies will also have to be more diligent in seeking out 
instances of farm animal cruelty and bringing offenders to justice, 
which will likely require more work for existing agents and/or spending 
money to hire more personnel.  
Lastly, the consequences of my argument will require that 
farmers, big and small, take an economic hit in the beginning. 
Respecting the interest of farm animals in not being the victims of 
cruelty is going to cost farmers money and time, and will probably 
require that animal farms either raise the price of their products or 
reduce the size of their operation, but as I hope I have shown, the 
economic interests of farmers and consumers is not all that matters. 
Farm animals sacrifice their well-being and their lives so that humans 
can satisfy a preference for eating meat, dairy, and eggs and so the 
 102 
least we can do is pay a little more so that they have adequate 
veterinary care, are given anesthetics prior to being killed or maimed, 
and handled in ways commensurate with being a living a creature. 
Also, a reduction in the size of animal farming operations and a rise in 
the price of farm animal products would probably not be a bad thing 
considering the environmental and health concerns associated with 
large-scale intensive animal farming and the health concerns linked to 
eating lots of meat.  
The changes that my simple argument requires will not be easy 
to fulfill, but it is what needs to be done if we are to take our apparent 
interest in animal suffering seriously. Doing what is right has never 
been synonymous with doing what is easy or profitable and it is right 
to respect the interest in being free from cruelty of the animals that 
have their lives sacrificed so that humans can satisfy a desire to eat 
animal flesh. We owe farm animals this much and we would do well to 
remember this in all of our dealings with them now and in the future. 
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